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THE USES OF IP MISUSE
Deepa Varadarajan*
ABSTRACT
Roughly seventy-five years ago, the equitable doctrine of misuse emerged as
a tool to police intellectual property (IP) owners’ overzealous contracting and
enforcement behavior. First in patent law and then in copyright, courts
developed the misuse doctrine to scrutinize practices that expanded IP rights in
socially disadvantageous ways. The misuse doctrine reminded IP owners that
their contractual freedom was not absolute, that legislatively calibrated
limitations on IP rights were more than mere suggestions, and that certain
enforcement tactics could trigger a court’s refusal to enforce IP rights.
In recent years, patent misuse doctrine has essentially gone the way of
antitrust—narrowing its focus to a thin sliver of anticompetitive harms.
Copyright misuse doctrine has, however, stayed faithful to broader IP policy
concerns. Courts have, for example, responded to misuse arguments where a
copyright owner’s licensing or enforcement behavior threatens to deter
innovative activity or socially valuable speech.
Similar to their IP counterparts, trade secret owners also engage in
problematic licensing and enforcement behavior. This is perhaps unsurprising,
given the growing legal and economic importance of trade secrets to firms. Yet
what is surprising is that courts have not developed an analogous trade secret
misuse doctrine. Instead, courts tend to ignore trade secret owners’ problematic
practices or evaluate them through the lens of ill-fitting doctrinal substitutes.
This Article takes the first close look at the justifications for introducing a trade
secret misuse doctrine—and considers how copyright misuse doctrine provides
a template for reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) owners have considerable freedom to decide the
terms upon which they will share patented technologies, copyrighted works, and
trade secret information. In general, the legal system is supportive of such
private arrangements and recognizes the efficiency benefits of IP licensing.1 At
the same time, private arrangements regarding IP can impact third parties and
the broader public. Indeed, IP laws are explicitly designed to balance owners’
interests against the public’s.2 To this end, owners get enough exclusivity to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of new works, but not so much that
others are deterred from engaging in critical discourse or building on existing
works.3 For this reason, patents and copyrights are term-limited,4 and others can
engage in certain socially valuable uses of an owner’s work without permission,
including “experimental uses” of a patented drug,5 “fair uses” of a copyrighted
work,6 and “reverse engineering” of trade secrets.7
Given these public-minded limitations on IP owners’ rights, the tenets of
contractual freedom and IP policy can conflict when owners impose restrictive
licensing conditions.8 For example, suppose a patent owner requires a licensee
to pay royalties past the patent term, or a copyright owner prevents a licensee
from engaging in critical speech, or a trade secret owner restrains a licensee from

1
See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Courts respect
freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside freely-entered agreements.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2017)
[hereinafter 2017 GUIDELINES] (recognizing that “intellectual property licensing . . . is generally
procompetitive.”).
2
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“[T]he Copyright Act . . . creates a balance
between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need
for access to creative works.”).
3
See id.; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1180 (2000) (“Virtually since their inception, both the copyright and patent laws have grappled with the
question of how to safeguard the incentive inherent in the grant of exclusive rights while at the same time
allowing second-comers to build on prior works.”).
4
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–05 (2012) (describing copyright duration); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012)
(describing patent term).
5
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
6
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
7
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
8
A robust academic literature explores the question of whether intellectual property laws should merely
be default rules that parties can contract around or fixed policy judgments that justify limitations on IP licensing.
For a sampling of this literature, see, for example, Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing,
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124 (2017); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 116 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin,
Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 877 (1999).
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reverse engineering software. Licensing terms aside, IP owners may also
exaggerate the scope of their rights and threaten meritless litigation, deterring
others from engaging in lawful innovative activity.9 From the IP owner’s
perspective, such practices may make strategic sense. But when should the rest
of us worry that an IP owner has gone too far, so to speak, engaging in acts that,
in the aggregate, can inflict societal harms related to competition, innovation, or
public discourse?
The misuse doctrine emerged to address such worries about “overreaching”
by IP owners. First in patent law and then in copyright, courts developed the
equitable doctrine of misuse to scrutinize owners’ practices that threatened to
expand the scope of IP rights in anticompetitive or other problematic ways.10
Misuse arguments are usually raised as an infringement defense, even though
the defendant asserting it need not herself be the victim of the offensive
practice.11 And the penalty for misuse is potent: the misusing owner cannot
enforce the patent or copyright against anyone until the offending practice stops
and “the consequences of the misuse . . . have been dissipated.”12
While copyright and patent misuse doctrines share these features, they have
nonetheless forged different paths. In recent decades, patent misuse doctrine has
moved closer to antitrust principles, placing competition concerns at the
forefront and embracing a “rule of reason” analysis.13 As a result, patent misuse
doctrine has become increasingly irrelevant outside a narrow sliver of cases
where a patent owner with market power engages in licensing practices with
demonstrable anticompetitive effects.14 By contrast, copyright misuse has
eschewed antitrust law’s strictures to consider broader IP policy concerns. To
this end, courts have invoked copyright misuse to scrutinize licensing and
enforcement practices that threaten not just competition, but also innovation and
speech. Misuse doctrine is a relatively under-examined aspect of intellectual
9
See Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]or a
copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property protection . . . that copyright law clearly does not
confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the
resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.”).
10
See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) (originating the modern
patent misuse doctrine and applying it to a patentee’s tying of patented salt-injection machines to unpatented salt
tablets), invalidated in part by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); Lasercomb Am.,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying copyright misuse to copyright owner’s software
license restriction).
11
See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972–73.
12
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493; see also infra Section I.C.
13
Under a rule of reason analysis, courts generally consider the likely anticompetitive effects and
procompetitive benefits of a challenged practice. See infra Section II.A.1.
14
See infra Section II.A.1.
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property law.15 But some commentators have pointed to the different trajectories
of patent and copyright misuse as suggestive of a “schizophrenic” or “chaotic”
doctrine.16
This Article develops a typology of concerns underlying copyright misuse
and explains why a nimble misuse doctrine is potentially more important for
copyright than patent. Courts and claimants have invoked copyright misuse not
only to address competitive harms, but also copyright owners’ acts that:
(i) preemptively restrain fair uses, like socially valuable speech and reverse
engineering; (ii) upset the subject matter boundary between patent and copyright
by sneaking functional works through the “back-door” of copyright protection;
and (iii) overclaim or misrepresent the legitimate scope of copyright,
particularly to unsophisticated audiences.17 This Article suggests that important
differences between copyright and patent law—in terms of their subject matter,
structure, and audience—help explain the divergence of copyright and patent
misuse doctrines.18
This Article then turns to trade secret law, a subset of IP that covers a vast
array of information firms try to keep secret, including formulas, mechanical
processes, business strategies, and aspects of software. Like other IP regimes,
trade secret law grants owners limited exclusivity to help stimulate investments
in innovation.19 And like their IP counterparts, trade secret owners engage in
15
Relatively few scholars have examined misuse across intellectual property laws. See generally
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2011); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007). For scholarly treatments of patent misuse, see generally Thomas F. Cotter, Four
Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 457 (2011); Robin C.
Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1990); Daryl Lim,
Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2014). For
scholarly treatments of copyright misuse, see generally Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1095 (2003); John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L. REV.
427 (2008); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A
Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000); JuNelle Harris, Beyond
Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83 (2004);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting
with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495 (2004); David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright
Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537 (2010); Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2004).
16
See, e.g., Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 932.
17
See infra Section II.B–II.D.
18
See infra Section II.E. This is not, however, meant to be an endorsement of patent misuse’s antitrust
orientation. A number of scholars have ably argued that patent misuse should retain a separate identity from
antitrust; this Author does not relitigate their persuasive arguments here. See generally Bohannan, supra note
15, at 478; Feldman, supra note 15, at 400.
19
See infra Part III. Unlike patent, copyright, and trade secret laws, the other major IP branch—trademark
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licensing and enforcement practices that threaten to expand their limited rights
in problematic ways.20 Trade secret law shares structural characteristics with
copyright law that make these acts of expansion more likely. Notably, copyright
and trade secret owners do not have to satisfy ex ante application, disclosure, or
claiming requirements—as patentees do.21 As a result, trade secret boundaries
are highly uncertain, making it easier for trade secret owners to misrepresent the
scope of their rights, particularly to legally unsophisticated audiences like
employees and former employees, who make up the largest category of trade
secret defendants.22
Given the structural similarities between copyright and trade secret law,
many of the policy concerns underlying copyright misuse resonate in the trade
secret context. Like copyright owners, trade secret owners restrain reverse
engineering, deter critical speech, and overclaim the scope of their trade secrets
to legally unsophisticated audiences.23 Yet curiously, courts have not developed
an analogous trade secret misuse doctrine. In misuse’s absence, some trade
secret defendants have attempted to raise misuse-like arguments through illfitting doctrinal substitutes, which courts have either ignored or insufficiently
addressed.24
This oversight is particularly troubling because trade secrecy’s significance
has swelled in recent decades—both in economic and legal terms. Indeed, trade
law—is not concerned with promoting innovation, but rather, reducing consumer confusion. See TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167–68 (2003). Given the consumer protection
rationale underlying trademark law, this Article does not address trademark law or trademark misuse. As with
trade secret law, courts have not widely recognized a trademark misuse doctrine akin to patent or copyright
misuse. See, e.g., KEMA, Inc. v. Koperwhats, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (questioning whether
“trademark misuse ever exists as a separate affirmative defense”); Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distribs.,
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 800, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (observing that “courts in other circuits have questioned the
existence [of a trademark misuse] defense”); see also William E. Ridgeway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of
Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1548 (2006) (describing trademark misuse as a “doctrine
with early roots but without contemporary recognition”). In any case, given the consumer protection rationale
underlying trademark law, there may be greater negative consequences for consumers when a trademark owner
is denied an injunction or prevented from enforcing its mark. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure
Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795 (2017) (criticizing courts’ denials of trademark injunctions in
infringement cases because of the public’s significant interest in not being confused by a defendant’s use of a
mark).
20
See infra Section III.B.
21
See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2014).
22
See David S. Ameling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ.
L. REV. 57, 69 (2010–2011) (conducting an empirical study of state appellate decisions between 1995 and 2009
and concluding that in 77% of cases, the alleged misappropriator was an employee or former employee).
23
See infra Section III.B.
24
See infra Section III.C.1.
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secrets were recently described as “the most pervasive form of intellectual
property in the modern economy.”25 Firms from a variety of industries report
their increased dependence on trade secrets.26 As the economic importance of
trade secrets has grown, so too has their legal recognition. Trade secrecy laws
started as a loose patchwork of state common law principles, but now, almost
every state legislature has enacted some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA).27 In 2016, Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA), which enables trade secret owners to assert claims under federal law as
well.28 These legal and economic developments invite fresh scrutiny of trade
secret law—and how owners’ practices can conflict with legislatively calibrated
limits on their rights to exclude.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the origins and common
features of patent and copyright misuse. Part II offers a framework for
understanding the diverging concerns of patent and copyright misuse. Part III
argues that many of the policy concerns underlying copyright misuse are
relevant to trade secret law and considers the potential benefits and costs of
introducing a trade secret misuse doctrine. To be sure, copyright misuse is not a
perfect doctrinal vehicle, and its application to trade secret law would require
adjustment. But copyright misuse asks important questions that are
insufficiently addressed by other limiting doctrines. In that sense, trade secret
should borrow a page from copyright’s book. Finally, this Article offers a few
recommendations for how courts might implement a trade secret misuse
doctrine.

25
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 3 (2017).
26
See JOHN E. JANKOWSKI, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., BUSINESS USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
DOCUMENTED IN NSF SURVEY 4 (2012) (reporting survey results finding that “[m]ore so than for other forms of
[inter partes review], a diverse group of industries reported trade secrets as very or somewhat important to their
businesses”).
27
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). All but two states (New York and North
Carolina) have enacted some form of the UTSA. Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, https://my.
uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
28
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (2018)). The DTSA amended the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to provide a federal cause of action
for trade secret misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b). Prior to the DTSA, civil trade secret claims could only
be asserted under state laws.
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ORIGINS AND COMMON FEATURES OF PATENT AND COPYRIGHT MISUSE
DOCTRINE

Patent and copyright laws have common origins and animating rationales.
Patent law covers technical, functional subject matter, such as new machines,
processes, and chemical compositions.29 Copyright law covers a broad range of
literary and artistic expression, including books, songs, paintings, and (more
recently) computer programs.30 Even though patent and copyright law focus on
different subject matter, Congress’s authority to enact both stems from the same
clause of the Constitution.31 Moreover, the same utilitarian justification
underlies both patent and copyright laws. That is, by providing time-limited
exclusive rights, patents and copyrights motivate inventors and authors to create
and disseminate their technological inventions and creative works.32 Yet despite
these similarities, patent and copyright laws are designed quite differently.
Notably, a patent is harder to obtain and expires more quickly than a
copyright. A patent seeker must undergo a lengthy and rigorous examination
process before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, demonstrating that her
invention is sufficiently useful, novel, nonobvious, and described so that others
in the field can learn from it.33 By contrast, a copyright seeker does not have to
apply for copyright protection. Copyright protection is automatic upon the
creation of a work, so long as it meets a very low threshold of originality and is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.34 Moreover, while an issued patent
lasts twenty years from the date the patent application was filed,35 a copyright
lasts much longer—usually for the author’s entire life plus seventy years after
the author’s death.36
29
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .”).
30
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); see 2 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 528–36 (2018).
31
See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the first patent and copyright
statutes soon after the country’s founding. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (codified in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.); Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
32
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 16–20; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004).
33
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112.
34
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (explaining
that to qualify for copyright protection, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount
will suffice” and “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite easily”).
35
See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
36
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
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While a patent is harder to get and expires sooner, it guards the owner’s
exclusivity more zealously than a copyright by prohibiting conduct that would
be permissible under copyright law. For example, patent infringement liability
extends to those who independently develop the same technology.37 By contrast,
copyright infringement only punishes copiers, not independent creators.38
Moreover, copyright protection extends only to the author’s original expression
of a work, not to any underlying ideas, facts, systems, processes, or other
functional elements divulged in the copyrighted work.39 Patent law purposely
covers functional subject matter.40 And finally, patent law does not have
copyright’s robust “fair use” limitation, which permits unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works for various socially valuable purposes.41
However, one limitation on owners’ rights that both patent and copyright
law share is the equitable doctrine of misuse. Broadly speaking, misuse doctrine
considers whether a patent or copyright owner has acted to “impermissibly
broaden” or “exceed the scope” of an intellectual property right, often through
licensing conditions.42 If misuse is found, a court will not enforce the intellectual
property right against anyone until the offensive conduct stops and the effects of
misuse are purged.43
A. Origins of Patent Misuse
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger44 decision is often
credited with originating the modern patent misuse doctrine.45 In Morton Salt,
37
See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525,
1525 (2007) (“Patent law gives patent owners not just the right to prevent others from copying their ideas, but
the power to control the use of their idea—even by those who independently develop a technology with no
knowledge of the patent or the patentee.”).
38
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (explaining that copyright infringement
requires proof of copying).
39
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
40
See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
41
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
42
See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lasercomb Am.,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
43
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
44
314 U.S. at 490–91; see Bohannan, supra note 15, at 485 (“Morton Salt is widely regarded as the first
case to apply the modern patent-misuse doctrine.”).
45
Even before Morton Salt, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to find contributory patent infringement in
cases involving patent holders’ tying of patented inventions to unpatented goods. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am.
v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 517 (1917). The Motion Picture Patents Co. (MPPC) case is often described as the first Supreme Court
case to apply the “principle of patent misuse.” See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.02 (2017) [hereinafter IP
AND ANTITRUST]. In MPPC, the plaintiff had a patent on a mechanism for feeding film into movie projectors
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the patent holder on a machine for depositing salt tablets required those leasing
the machines to use them only with salt tablets purchased from the patent
holder.46 The Court determined that the patent holder had exceeded its patent
right on the machine—had “misused” the patent—by tying it to an unpatented
product (salt tablets).47 As a result, the Court held the patent holder could not
enforce its patent right against anyone until “the improper practice ha[d] been
abandoned” and “the consequences of the misuse . . . dissipated.”48 In
formalizing the patent misuse doctrine, the Court invoked competition concerns,
as well as the broader “public policy” and “public interest” concerns underlying
the patent system.49 The Court explained: “The patentee, like . . . other holders
of an exclusive privilege granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not
claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert that
policy.”50
In the years following Morton Salt, the Supreme Court applied patent misuse
to various tying requirements and other attempts to “enlarge” or “expand” the
legitimate scope of a patent.51 In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,52 for example, the
Supreme Court applied misuse principles to post-term royalty provisions—i.e.,
license provisions requiring royalty payments even after expiration of the

and tied the use of its patented projectors to the purchase of its unpatented films. 243 U.S. at 505. The Supreme
Court articulated misuse principles in rejecting the restriction, observing that “[s]uch a restriction is invalid
because such a film is obviously not any part of the invention of the patent in suit.” Id. at 518. Yet MPPC
“did not create the modern misuse doctrine as we know it today,” for it did not describe unenforceability of the
patent as misuse’s remedy or explain that alleged patent infringers unharmed by the misuse could raise it as a
defense. Bohannan, supra note 15, at 480.
46
See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490–91.
47
Id. at 491.
48
Id. at 493.
49
Id. at 492 (“[T]he public policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from
it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive
right . . . not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant . . . . It is a principle
of general application that courts… may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right
asserted contrary to the public interest.”).
50
Id. at 494.
51
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969) (holding that
patentee’s setting royalty rates on the basis of the licensee’s sale of unpatented products could constitute misuse);
Transparent–Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 644 (1947); Berlenbach v. Anderson &
Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784–85 (9th Cir. 1964) (“[A] clause prohibiting a licensee from selling articles
in competition with the patented articles likewise constitutes patent misuse . . . .”); Nat’l Lockwasher Co. v.
George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1943) (finding misuse where patentee used the patent to
“suppress the manufacture of possible competing goods not covered by its patent”).
52
379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
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underlying patent.53 The Court analogized such provisions to tying requirements
and deemed them “counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.”54
These early patent misuse cases were not beholden to antitrust principles,
but instead invoked broader policy concerns underlying patent law. In recent
decades, however, both the Federal Circuit and Congress have shifted patent
misuse doctrine closer towards antitrust standards.55 The growing influence of
antitrust law on patent misuse doctrine is discussed further in Part II.
B. Origins of Copyright Misuse
Misuse doctrine migrated beyond patent to copyright during the late
twentieth century.56 Although the Supreme Court has not “firmly established” a
misuse doctrine in copyright,57 it has “tacitly approved” the copyright analogy
to patent misuse.58 The first appellate court to apply “copyright misuse” doctrine
was the Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.59
Like the foundational patent misuse cases, Lasercomb involved restrictive
licensing terms. The defendants had licensed die-making software from
Lasercomb.60 Lasercomb imposed a standard licensing agreement on its
licensees, barring them from “writing, developing, producing, or selling
computer-assisted die-making software” for a term of ninety-nine years.61 The

53

Id.
Id. at 31 (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)). “[P]roject[ing] . . .
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by
tying the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.” Id. at 33.
55
Today, a tying case like Morton Salt would likely be analyzed differently. A court would not assume
that a patent confers market power on its owner. See infra Section II.A.1.
56
Although copyright defendants tried to invoke analogies to patent misuse in earlier decades, they were
often unsuccessful. See, e.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(refusing to extend the rationale of Morton Salt to copyright); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enters., Inc., 162
F. Supp. 129, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (“The affirmative defense of violation of the Anti-Trust laws . . . is not
permitted in a copyright infringement action.”), aff’d, Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494
(3d Cir. 1959).
57
See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
58
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[A][2][b] (2013)
(describing the Court’s “tacit approval” of copyright misuse doctrine). In a few mid-twentieth century decisions,
the Court condemned copyright owners’ block book licensing (i.e., where copyright holders conditioned the
licensing of popular films on the licensing of less popular films). Analogizing this tying practice to earlier patent
misuse cases, the Court deemed copyright owners’ block booking practices illegal under antitrust law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lowe’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45–46 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131, 156–59 (1948).
59
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
60
Id. at 971–72.
61
Id. at 972–73.
54
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defendants copied Lasercomb’s software and marketed it as their own diemaking software.62 Lasercomb sued the defendants for copyright infringement.63
The defendants did not deny copying the software but nonetheless invoked a
defense of copyright misuse based on Lasercomb’s restrictive licensing terms.64
Citing the “parallel public interests” of copyright and patent law, the Fourth
Circuit formally recognized copyright misuse doctrine.65 Invoking the reasoning
of early patent misuse cases like Morton Salt, the Fourth Circuit deemed
Lasercomb’s license restriction to be copyright misuse because the copyright
“was being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright.”66 The court explained:
Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of [its
software] code. Its standard licensing agreement, however, goes much
further and essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee
to independently implement the idea which [the software] expresses.
The agreement forbids the licensee . . . [and] all its directors, officers
and employees from assisting in any manner to develop computerassisted die-making software. Although one or another licensee might
succeed in negotiating out the noncompete provisions, this does not
negate the fact that Lasercomb is attempting to use its copyright in a
manner adverse to the public policy embodied in copyright law, and
that it has succeeded in doing so with at least one licensee.67

The Fourth Circuit highlighted the “extremely broad” language of the licensing
agreement, which forced licensees to forego “creative abilities . . . in the area
of . . . die-making software” and thus remove them “from the public.”68 The
court also emphasized the lengthy period of the restraint: “ninety-nine years,
which could be longer than the life of the copyright itself.”69
In the decades since Lasercomb, a majority of circuit courts have recognized
copyright misuse.70 In contrast to patent misuse, however, copyright misuse
62

See id. at 971–72.
Id. at 972.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 976 (“Both patent law and copyright law seek to increase the store of human knowledge and arts
by rewarding inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time. At the same time,
the granted monopoly power does not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright.”).
66
Id. at 978–79.
67
Id. at 978.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
The doctrine has been recognized in almost all circuits. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342
F.3d 191, 204–06 (3d Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice
63
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cases have turned away from antitrust standards and embraced broader policy
concerns. This important divergence between patent and copyright misuse is
discussed further in Part II.
C. Common Features of Patent and Copyright Misuse
Before addressing the differing trajectories of patent and copyright misuse,
it is worth noting their common features. First, misuse arguments are typically
raised as an infringement defense.71 In some cases, however, a licensee brings a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether an intellectual property owner
has committed misuse,72 or raises the argument in response to a breach of
contract claim.73 These other procedural avenues are less common—and have
been expressly rejected by some courts in copyright misuse cases.74
Second, the defendant raising the misuse argument need not herself be a
victim of the misuse, so long as she can show that the patent or copyright owner

Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); qad. inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992); United Tel.
Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 611–12 (8th Cir. 1988) (assuming “that judicial authority
teaches that the patent misuse doctrine may be applied or asserted as a defense to copyright infringement”); Saks
Inc. v. Attachmate Corp., No. 14 Civ. 4902(CM), 2015 WL 1841136, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2015) (“While
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has never formally endorsed the affirmative defense of copyright misuse,
a number of district courts in this circuit have refused to strike such a defense, so it is incorrect to suggest that
this defense is not recognized in this Circuit.”); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772
F. Supp. 614, 752 (D.D.C. 1991); see also IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.04[A] (“All told, the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, and district courts in all other
circuits except the Tenth, have held that a copyright misuse defense exits.”); cf. Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration
Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 65 (1st Cir. 2012) (considering misuse arguments but observing that
“this court has not yet recognized misuse of a copyright as a defense to infringement”); Telecom Tech. Servs. v.
Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir. 2004) (avoiding decision to recognize copyright misuse); Design Basics,
LLC v. Petros Homes, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 712, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (recognizing copyright misuse but
acknowledging that “the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the topic” of copyright misuse).
71
See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Patent misuse
developed as a nonstatutory defense to claims of patent infringement.”).
72
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2403 (2015) (describing how Marvel brought
a declaratory judgment in federal district court confirming that it could stop paying Kimble post-term royalties);
Cty. Materials Corp. v Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 732–33 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing declaratory
judgment action claiming that licensor’s conduct constituted misuse); Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Comput. Assocs.
Int’l, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1463, 1466 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (permitting copyright misuse to be raised as both as a
defense to copyright infringement, and as an independently actionable claim).
73
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., the patent misuse-like argument was raised as a defense to a state-law breach
of contract claim when the licensee stopped paying royalties on the contract after expiration of the patent. 379
U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
74
See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding that “test preparation service could not affirmatively claim copyright misuse by test provider, apart
from use as defense to infringement claim”). See infra text accompanying notes 369–71.
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misused the intellectual property right against another party.75 In Lasercomb, for
example, the defendants asserting copyright misuse were not bound by the
offensive licensing agreement—though others were.76 The absence of a
“standing”-type requirement for raising misuse arguments distinguishes it from
certain contract defenses as well as antitrust law.77
Third, the penalty for misuse is quite potent. The patent or copyright cannot
be enforced against anyone until the “improper practice has been abandoned
and . . . the consequences of the misuse . . . have been dissipated.”78 The remedy
for misuse can be distinguished from antitrust remedies, which include damages
but not the unenforceability of the underlying intellectual property right.79 This
remedy can also be distinguished from contract law remedies, which might
render an offensive licensing agreement unenforceable, but not the underlying
intellectual property right upon which the agreement was based.80
And finally, it is fair to say that courts apply misuse doctrine “sparingly”81—
or at least, “not expansively.”82 Defendants raise misuse arguments with some
frequency, but they are difficult to win in practice.83 Some commentators
speculate that courts rarely find misuse due to the doctrine’s combination of a
75
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) (“It is the adverse effect upon the
public interest of a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the patentee’s course of conduct which
disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse
of the patent.”).
76
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (observing that the “[d]efendants
were not themselves bound by the standard licensing agreement” but they proved “at least one other licensee”
had entered into the standard agreement that included the restrictive terms). In the patent misuse context, Daryl
Lim has empirically observed that “[o]nly in two percent of the cases” involving a patent misuse allegation from
1953 to 2013 was the defendant “an unrelated third party.” Lim, supra note 15, at 374.
77
Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 902 (“[T]here is no misuse ‘standing’ requirement, as would be
necessary to assert the defense of unclean hands in a contract action—or, for that matter, to assert a viable
antitrust claim.”); see infra text accompanying notes 327–31.
78
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. At least one court, however, seems to have broken from this remedial
approach by suggesting that a plaintiff may “ultimately recover[] for acts of infringement that occur during the
period of misuse,” after the misuse stops. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1108 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
79
See, e.g., Cross & Yu, supra note 15, at 454 (“Violation of the law of monopolies is not a defense to a
copyright infringement claim. Nor can the victim use that law to have the copyright declared invalid.”).
80
See infra text accompanying notes 327–29.
81
Apple Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that it has “sparingly” applied
copyright misuse doctrine).
82
Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Because patent misuse is
a judge-made doctrine that is in derogation of statutory patent rights against infringement, this court has not
applied the doctrine of patent misuse expansively.”).
83
See Barnett, supra note 8, at 129 (observing that, despite its low success rate, patent misuse “continues
to be asserted as an affirmative defense in a significant number of cases”); Lim, supra note 15, at 313, 322–29
(observing an increase in patent misuse claims and a decline in their success).
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severe penalty and an unclear standard.84 As discussed in the next Part, that
misuse doctrine is unclear stems from confusion about its underlying concerns,
which in turn, vary from patent to copyright. A high threshold for misuse may
be desirable,85 but it should stem from clarity rather than confusion about the
doctrine’s goals.
II. THE DIVERGING CONCERNS OF PATENT AND COPYRIGHT MISUSE
In both patent and copyright law, courts craft vague formulations to describe
the goals of misuse doctrine. They describe misuse doctrine as preventing
owners from “exceeding” or “going beyond the scope” of granted IP rights.86
But such phrases offer little in the way of practical guidance because the scope
or boundaries of IP rights are often unclear. In this way, IP boundaries are unlike
real property boundaries.87 For example, despite patent law’s requirement that
patentees must claim the boundaries of their inventions, the words of a claim are
subject to linguistic uncertainty.88 Copyright boundaries are even more
uncertain, as there are no claims to speak of, and the law imposes various
context-specific limitations like fair use.89 The duration of a patent or copyright
is relatively easy to determine, but along non-temporal dimensions, the
boundaries of IP rights are uncertain.
Instead of relying on any “beyond the scope” formulation, this Part
categorizes the specific policy concerns invoked in misuse cases. Patent misuse
cases fixate primarily on competitive harms, using antitrust law’s “rule of
reason” standard as the lodestar for analysis. By contrast, copyright misuse cases
employ a more flexible approach for assessing competitive harms, and more
importantly, engage a broader set of policy concerns. By developing a typology
of concerns animating copyright misuse caselaw, this Part seeks to clarify the
goals of copyright misuse. As this Part demonstrates, copyright misuse caselaw
is concerned not only with competitive harms, but also with copyright owners’
acts that (i) preemptively restrain socially valuable fair uses, like critical speech
and reverse engineering; (ii) upset the subject matter boundary between patent
and copyright by sneaking functional works through the “back-door” of

84

See, e.g., Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 960.
See infra Section III.C.2.a.
86
See supra note 42.
87
See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2207 (2016).
88
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009).
89
See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 87, at 2210, 2226.
85
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copyright protection; and (iii) misrepresent or overclaim the legitimate scope of
a copyright, particularly to unsophisticated audiences.
This Part also explains the divergent paths of patent and copyright misuse
doctrine by comparing the subject matter, structure, and audience of patent and
copyright laws. Rather than suggesting a doctrine in “chaos,”90 the deviating
trajectories of patent and copyright misuse respond to important differences
between these two areas of IP. These differences help justify a copyright misuse
doctrine that focuses on a broader set of concerns than patent misuse. Later, Part
III suggests that because trade secret law shares important structural similarities
with copyright, the concerns animating copyright misuse also resonate in the
trade secret context—and may merit the introduction of a trade secret misuse
doctrine.
A. Competition Harms
From its inception, one important concern of misuse doctrine has been harms
to competition. For example, in Morton Salt, the Court observed that the
patentee was “making use of its patent monopoly to restrain competition in the
marketing of unpatented articles.”91 Similarly, in Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit
characterized the challenged license provision as “anticompetitive” and
criticized Lasercomb’s “attempt to use its [software] copyright . . . to control
competition in . . . the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture.”92
Since these foundational cases, a number of courts have cited competition
harms as an important policy concern underlying misuse doctrine. To this end,
courts have applied misuse doctrine to evaluate various kinds of licensing
practices with potential anticompetitive effects. Such practices include tying
arrangements, post-term royalties, territorial restrictions, exclusive dealing, noncompetition provisions, and grant-back requirements.93
Of course, such licensing practices can also trigger scrutiny under antitrust
law.94 Thus, one recurring question in misuse caselaw and scholarship is how
much antitrust law—the area of law most directly concerned with assessing
competitive harms—should guide misuse analysis. Patent and copyright have
answered this question differently. Over the past few decades, patent misuse
90

See, e.g., Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 932.
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942).
92
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
93
See, e.g., id. at 976 (describing courts’ application of patent misuse in cases where “patent owners have
attempted to use their patents for price fixing, tie-ins, territorial restrictions, and so-forth”).
94
See 2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
91
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doctrine has narrowed its focus to competitive harms and applied antitrust
principles to guide its analysis.95 By contrast, copyright misuse doctrine has
largely ignored antitrust principles in assessing competitive harms, and more
importantly, has focused on a broader set of concerns beyond the anticompetitive
effects of a challenged practice.96
1. Patent Misuse: Moving Toward Antitrust
Since its formation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has played a pivotal role in
shaping patent misuse doctrine. Over the past few decades, it has focused misuse
analysis on demonstrable anticompetitive effects, relying primarily on antitrust
law’s “rule of reason” to assess challenged practices.97 As the Federal Circuit
has explained, a successful assertion of patent misuse requires a showing that
the patentee has “impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the
patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”98 While certain practices like pricefixing and post-term royalty arrangements have been deemed “per se patent
misuse,”99 most challenged practices are assessed in accordance with antitrust
law’s rule of reason.100
Under the rule of reason, a fact finder typically considers whether the
challenged practice “is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether
the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that

95

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
97
See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc, v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The appropriate
criterion is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has
ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule
of reason.”); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Cotter,
Misuse, supra note 15, at 912 (describing how, outside of the few practices deemed “per se” misuse or per se
lawful, courts analyze the challenged practice in accordance with antitrust’s rule of reason); Feldman, supra note
15, at 418 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has largely “reframed” the patent misuse test in antitrust terms).
98
Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Windsurfing Int’l, 782
F.2d at 1001) (emphasis added).
99
See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2407, 2415 (2015) (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964)) (reaffirming Brulotte’s holding that post-term royalty provisions in a patent license are
“unlawful per se”). While tying arrangements in which the patentee conditions a patent license on the purchase
of an unpatented staple good (e.g., the Morton Salt scenario) were once considered “per se” misuse, this category
of misuse has been subsequently limited by 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) to situations where the patentee has
market power in the tying market product.
100
See Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (“When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se
patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by § 271(d) . . . that practice must then be
analyzed in accordance with the ‘rule of reason.’”); see also IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.04[E]
(“The Virginia Panel court expressly invoked antitrust’s rule of a reason as a determinant in most patent misuse
cases.”).
96
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outweigh those anticompetitive effects.”101 Generally, a claimant must
demonstrate the IP owner’s market power in the relevant market for the product
or process that embodies the IP right.102 Absent market power, the owner’s
practice is regarded as unlikely to have anticompetitive effects.103 Courts will
not presume that a patent—or any IP right—confers market power on its
owner.104 Although the Federal Circuit continues to describe patent misuse as a
“broader wrong than [an] antitrust violation,”105 outside of a few limited “per
se” misuse scenarios, there is considerable overlap.106
Congress also implicitly endorsed this antitrust-influenced model for patent
misuse when passing the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988.107 Among other
things, the Act provides that tying an unpatented product to a patented product
(i.e., the Morton Salt scenario) is not misuse unless market power in the patented
product can be proven.108 According to one empirical study, the antitrust-

101
2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 16–17; see also Feldman supra note 15, at 422 n.113 (contrasting
the “rule of reason” and its singular focus on competitive impact with other judicial balancing tests, and
suggesting the “rule of reason” imposes “thresholds and elements that are burdensome to establish”). For a
detailed analysis of antitrust’s rule of reason analysis, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason,
70 FLA. L. REV. 81 (2018).
102
Bohannan, supra note 15, at 487. Market power is defined as “the ability to profitably maintain prices
above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of time.” 2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at
4. A patent or copyright owner may not have market power because, for example, there are sufficient substitutes
for that product. Absent market power, “a firm cannot raise prices, limit supplies, and create the type of
anticompetitive effects that antitrust law recognizes. Thus, where no market power exists, antitrust is generally
unconcerned by firm behavior. This is particularly true for the rule of reason, which always requires a finding of

market power.” Feldman, supra note 15, at 400.
103
Feldman, supra note 15, at 400.
104

See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42, 45 (2006).
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
106
See IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.04[B] (observing “congruence between the two doctrines”
of patent misuse and antitrust); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 467, 563 (2015) (“In general, the courts have moved . . . to a framework that limits [patent] misuse to
conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.”).
107
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (listing patent-related activities that may have been considered misuse
at one time, but are no longer misuse, including a refusal to license and certain tying activities). However,
Congress rejected a prior version of the Act that would have expressly limited patent misuse to cases of antitrust
violation. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-492, at 17–18 (1988); Bohannan, supra note 15, at 487–88 (arguing that
“Congress considered and rejected legislation that would have explicitly limited misuse to antitrust principles”).
108
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on
the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on
which the license or sale is conditioned.”); cf. Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 923–24 (arguing that while
“Patent Act section 271(d)(5) moves the law of tying misuse closer to its antitrust counterpart, the overlap is not
105
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influenced rule of reason approach has led to an overall reduced rate of success
for patent misuse.109
One area where patent misuse doctrine has, however, conspicuously parted
ways with antitrust involves post-term royalty agreements. Such agreements
require licensees to pay royalties after the patent has expired. Notably, in the
recent Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment decision, the Supreme Court upheld its
earlier decision in Brulotte and deemed post-term royalty provisions in a patent
license “unlawful per se.”110 By contrast, a rule of reason analysis would have
required clearer proof of market power and anticompetitive effects before
finding post-term royalties to be a violation.111 Emphasizing the importance of
stare decisis, the Court refused to overrule Brulotte.112 But the Court seemed to
do so grudgingly, and went out of its way to emphasize potential pro-competitive
benefits of post-term royalty provisions and the limited nature of its holding.113
Thus, Kimble should not be read as signaling patent misuse’s parting of ways
with antitrust principles—at least, not outside of the post-term royalty context.
And Kimble notwithstanding, the general tilt of patent misuse doctrine has
been towards antitrust principles—requiring proof of market power and
demonstrable anticompetitive effects in the relevant market for the patented
product. Some commentators applaud this tilt, arguing that antitrust is a more

complete; it may be that assertions of tying misuse can be sustained on a lesser showing of anticompetitive harm
than would be the case with respect to an analogous antitrust claim”).
109
See Lim, supra note 15, at 322–29.
110
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S.
29, 32 (1964)). In Kimble, Marvel’s corporate predecessor had purchased Kimble’s patent on a foam webshooting toy in exchange for a lump sum plus a 3% royalty on future sales—with no end date for royalties
specified in the agreement. Id. at 2406. Marvel sought a declaratory judgment that it could stop making royalty
payments at the end of the patent term. Id. While the Supreme Court never used the phrase “patent misuse” in
Kimble (or its predecessor, Brulotte) scholars and treatises routinely describe both cases as examples of “patent
misuse.” See, e.g., Exela Pharma Scis., LLC v. Lee, 781 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Brulotte as a
“patent misuse” decision); Cty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2007); IP AND
ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.03[C] (“While Brulotte itself did not invoke the patent misuse
doctrine . . . term extension has been accepted into the canon of patent misuse.”).
111
See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 923 (“An agreement to continue collecting royalties after the
patent term, for example, as in Brulotte, would not constitute an antitrust violation absent much clearer proof of
anticompetitive effect.”).
112
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2403, 2406–11.
113
See id. at 2408, 2413 (emphasizing the ease with which the Kimble–Brulotte per se analysis could be
avoided, either by specifying in the contract that payments for “pre-expiration use” of a patent are being deferred
“into the post-expiration period” or by tying post-expiration royalties to a “non-patent right,” like a closely
related trade secret, and also noting that Brulotte “poses no bar to business arrangements other than royalties”).
Similarly, “reach-through” licenses that require licensees to pay royalties on post-term sales of drugs that are
discovered using a patented research tool during the patent term have survived the patent misuse inquiry. See
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472–73 (D. Del. 2002).
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reliable and developed body of law for analyzing competitive harms than
misuse.114 Others critique it, arguing that certain licensing and enforcement
practices cause competitive harms that go unrecognized under antitrust’s rule of
reason standard.115 Examples of competitive (and related innovation) harms that
may fall short of antitrust’s standard include harms to submarkets, harms arising
from aggregate rather than unilateral conduct, or harms to “a market for a
product that does not yet exist but may exist in the future if innovation proceeds
in some expected fashion.”116
Professor Christina Bohannan, for example, highlights restrictive licensing
provisions that “prevent[] nascent products and technologies” from
developing.117 Where potential rivals have not yet introduced a new product to
the market, the effects of a patentee’s licensing condition would be speculative
and hard to prove under antitrust standards.118 And yet, “it is often the IP holder’s
anticompetitive or anti-innovative conduct that precludes further development
and marketing of the competing technology.”119 Bohannan and other critics have
offered persuasive arguments in favor of a patent misuse doctrine that retains a
separate identity from antitrust.120 Yet patent misuse has nonetheless moved
closer to antitrust.
2. Copyright Misuse: Flexibility and Deviation from Antitrust
Copyright misuse, by contrast, has forged a path more attuned to broader
copyright policy concerns. While some courts mention competitive harms when

114
See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If misuse claims are not
tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be tested?”); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET
AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1781d4, at 474–75
(2d ed. 2004) (“[N]o contract or patent [should] be denied enforcement unless the challenged behavior would
constitute a substantive antitrust violation” because “the antitrust laws are society’s designated and generally
applicable vehicle for deciding what is anticompetitive.”).
115
See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 15, at 514 (arguing in favor of a misuse doctrine that focuses on
“foreclosure” of competition, innovation, and access to the public domain, rather than adherence to antitrust
standards); Feldman, supra note 15, at 414; Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting
Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 793–94 (1988).
116
Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
483, 534–36 (2006).
117
Bohannan, supra note 15, at 514.
118
See id.
119
Id. (noting the relationship between innovation harms and competitive harms and the difficulty of
disentangling the two, because “[c]onduct that is anticompetitive is often also anti-innovative”).
120
See, e.g., id. at 500, 525–26; Feldman, supra note 15, at 400–01; Hovenkamp, supra note 106, at 562
(arguing that “by limiting misuse to conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws” courts have “take[n]
misuse out of patent policy where it belongs and place[d] it within antitrust policy”).
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assessing copyright misuse, they largely eschew antitrust principles.121 That is,
copyright cases are far less likely than patent to draw from antitrust’s “rule of
reason” analysis or require the party alleging misuse to demonstrate the owner’s
market power in the relevant market for the copyrighted product.122 For
example, in Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s
“misplaced reliance” on antitrust’s rule of reason standard in finding the
challenged provision reasonable.123
More importantly, courts have identified a broader set of concerns
underlying copyright misuse than competitive harms. Copyright misuse is still
an evolving doctrine, the “contours of which are still being defined.”124 But as
the following sections demonstrate, courts have invoked copyright misuse when
an owner (i) preemptively restrains fair uses (e.g., socially valuable speech and
reverse engineering); (ii) upsets the patent-copyright boundary by sneaking
certain functional works through the “back-door” of copyright protection; and
(iii) “overclaims” the legitimate scope of copyright, particularly to
unsophisticated audiences. These concerns stem primarily from copyright (and
IP) policy writ large, rather than a singular focus on anticompetitive effects.
B. Deterring Socially Valuable Uses
Courts and commentators have invoked copyright misuse to scrutinize
owners’ restraints on critical speech and reverse engineering—as a supplement
to fair use doctrine. Copyright’s fair use doctrine insulates a variety of
unauthorized but socially beneficial uses of a copyrighted work from liability.125
Section 107 of the Copyright Act describes various examples of fair use,
121
See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 925–27 (“Whatever the current state of patent misuse may be, it
is clear that copyright misuse, as currently understood by several circuit courts, goes well beyond the contours
of antitrust law.”).
122
See id.; cf. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 2004)
(observing that “although an antitrust violation is not a prerequisite to showing misuse, failure to show a violation
of the antitrust laws makes it more difficult for the court to find copyright misuse”).
123
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (“If, as it appears, the district
court analogized from the ‘rule of reason’ concept of antitrust law, we think its reliance on that principle was
misplaced . . . . [W]hile it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably would
give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation
of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action. The question is not whether
the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law . . . but whether the copyright is being used in
a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”); see also Frischmann & Moylan,
supra note 15, at 890 (“[I]n applying the copyright misuse doctrine to the facts, the [Lasercomb] court paid
particular attention to the language of the licensing agreement and did not focus on the actual effects on
competition or market power of the plaintiff, as it would in an antitrust analysis.”).
124
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
125
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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including use of the copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research.”126 But there are no
presumptive or automatic categories of fair use. Instead, courts consider four
nonexclusive factors when assessing fair use, including the “purpose and
character” of the defendant’s unauthorized use of the copyrighted work, as well
as its potential market harm to the owner.127 In addition, “transformative use[s]”
of the copyrighted work—i.e., those that “add[] something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message”—are more likely to be fair uses.128
The fair use doctrine serves dual purposes: it is an “important safety valve[]”
both for “promoting cumulative creativity and free expression.”129 As the
Supreme Court has observed, the “latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use” helps reconcile the Copyright Act with the
First Amendment.130 Fair use also has been justified as a way to avoid market
failure that would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected
work.131 Fair use doctrine recognizes that certain acts by the defendant may
infringe a copyright, but nonetheless produce positive externalities. These
benefits to society might not be captured or considered by parties negotiating a
copyright license.132
Yet the protections of fair use doctrine may not sufficiently safeguard speech
or cumulative creativity. Notably, to succeed in demonstrating fair use, the
defendant has typically engaged in the socially valuable act by the time of

126

Id.
Id. (considering “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).
128
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 605 (2008) (empirically finding
that “[i]n those cases where the defendant’s otherwise infringing use was deemed transformative, it exerted
nearly dispositive force”).
129
MERGES ET. AL., supra note 30, at 609.
130
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (describing fair use doctrine and the idea/expression distinction as “copyright’s builtin free speech safeguards”).
131
For example, copyright owners may have noneconomic reasons to prohibit certain transformative
uses—especially parodic or critical uses—and may be unwilling to license their works for such uses at any price.
At the same time, such uses have positive externalities that the transformative user cannot capture, making her
unwilling to pay for a license. Other kinds of market failure include cases where high transaction costs stand in
the way of private bargaining. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614, 1632–35 (1982).
132
See id. at 1630–31.
127
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litigation.133 That is, she has rendered the critical speech, reverse engineered the
software, or transformed the original work in a way that merits excuse from
infringement liability. By contrast, copyright misuse doctrine recognizes that
such acts might not have happened yet—and that owners’ licensing practices
will likely prevent them from occurring.134
Some courts and commentators have thus rationalized copyright misuse as
an important complement to fair use, because it asks whether the owner’s
licensing provisions are so restrictive that they will likely deter socially valuable
fair uses before they occur.135 And with misuse, the defendant does not have to
be the person or entity that has done—or is likely to do—something
transformative, improving, or otherwise deserving of the fair use defense.
Instead, the defendant claiming misuse is acting on behalf of other fair users
(both actual and potential), by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s acts
preemptively squelch fair use-worthy contributions. Such misuse arguments
have been raised—albeit to limited success—in cases involving licensing
restraints on critical speech and reverse engineering.
1. Critical Speech
When copyright owners restrict critical speech, copyright misuse doctrine
can supplement the policy goals of fair use. The Third Circuit explained this
function of copyright misuse in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home
Entertainment, Inc.136 In Video Pipeline, Disney licensed movie trailers to
website owners, on the condition that they refrain from criticizing Disney, its

133

See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 925.
See id. (“The fair use defense succeeds only where the defendant at bar makes some fair use of a
copyrighted work. In contrast, courts evaluating a misuse defense primarily focus on the plaintiff’s
conduct . . . .”); Harris, supra note 15, at 109 (describing the inadequacies of the fair use doctrine for protecting
certain kinds of critical speech). Interestingly, a recent California district court opinion implied a similar
complementary role between copyright misuse and copyright’s first sale or exhaustion defense, which provides
that once a copyrighted item is sold, the copyright owner cannot use copyright law to prevent the buyer from
transferring that particular copy. Compare 17 U.S.C.§ 109(a) (2012), with Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox
Automated Retail, LLC, No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 WL 1942139, at *2, *6, *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20,
2018) (denying Disney’s preliminary injunction motion on the ground that Redbox would likely succeed on its
copyright misuse defense because Disney’s website terms improperly “restricted secondary transfers” of
purchased DVDs in violation of the first sale doctrine). A few months later, however, the same court appeared
to reverse course. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx),
2018 WL 4182483, at *4, *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2018) (granting Disney a preliminary injunction after it
refashioned its restrictions as “click-wrap” terms written on the movie packages themselves).
135
See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 (3d Cir. 2003);
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 925; Olson, supra note 15, at 559.
136
342 F.3d at 194.
134
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movies, or the entertainment industry on their websites.137 One website owner,
Video Pipeline, subsequently replaced the Disney trailers on its website with
two-minute clips copied from various Disney movies.138 Video Pipeline filed a
declaratory judgment action, arguing that its acts of copying were fair use and
that Disney’s attempt to suppress criticisms through its licensing conditions
amounted to copyright misuse, precluding copyright enforcement.139
The Third Circuit rejected Video Pipeline’s fair use defense, due largely to
the commercial and non-transformative nature of its use.140 However, the Third
Circuit explained that copyright misuse could “operate beyond its traditional
anti-competition context” by supplementing copyright balancing doctrines like
fair use, and thereby promote copyright law’s “underlying policy rationale”:
[I]t is possible that a copyright holder could leverage its copyright to
restrain the creative expression of another without engaging in anticompetitive behavior or implicating the fair use and idea/expression
doctrines . . . . A copyright holder’s attempt to restrict expression that
is critical of it (or of its copyrighted good, or the industry in which it
operates, etc.) may, in context, subvert . . . a copyright’s policy goal to
encourage the creation and dissemination to the public of creative
activity.141

The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that Disney’s restrictions did not
constitute misuse because website owners were free to voice criticism in other
media—just not websites featuring Disney trailers.142 A more onerous speech
restriction may, however, have led to a different result.143
Citing Buena Vista and similar examples, Professor David Olson has argued
that copyright misuse should be “decoupled” from any competition-based
moorings, and should instead be “refocused and grounded in First Amendment
speech interests.”144 He explains that “defining as copyright misuse the
137

Id. at 194–95, 206.
Id. at 195.
139
Id. at 203–04.
140
See id. at 202.
141
Id. at 204–06 (observing copyright misuse’s focus on “the copyright holder’s attempt to disrupt a
copyright’s goal to increase the store of creative expression for the public good”).
142
Id. at 206.
143
See id. (acknowledging that Disney’s licensing agreements did “seek to restrict expression,” but
expressing doubt that the interference with creative expression “was to such a degree that they affect in any
significant way the policy interest in increasing the public store of creative activity”).
144
Olson, supra note 15, at 568–69 (describing examples of “copyright holders demand[ing] that, in
exchange for a license to use the copyrighted work, certain topics may not be discussed, or may only be discussed
in a favorable way-or in a negative way-depending on the axe the copyright owner has to grind” or “that, in
exchange for a copyright license, the author must agree not to research, investigate, or write about certain things
138
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unjustified chilling of speech . . . will encourage important speech rights that are
currently underprotected.”145 An entirely speech-focused misuse doctrine is a
normative vision that is hard to square descriptively with existing caselaw. But
certainly, one important function of copyright misuse doctrine is to scrutinize
speech-chilling restrictions that undercut copyright law’s First Amendment
safeguards.
2. Reverse Engineering
Software licenses that prohibit reverse engineering offer another example of
copyright misuse’s potential role as a useful backstop for fair use. Software
licenses often contain broad prohibitions against product disassembly,
decompiling, or any other form of reverse engineering.146 Such restrictions have
triggered scholarly condemnation and concern, because they prohibit licensees
from accessing certain “unprotectable” aspects of software, like its underlying
ideas or functional elements, or engaging in socially valuable activities, like
creating interoperable programs, that would otherwise be deemed fair use.147
To put this in context, it is important to understand that software occupies
an odd place in copyright law. In general, copyright law is concerned with the
expressive or creative aspects of a work, while patent law is concerned with the
functional aspects of a device or process.148 The inclusion of software within
copyright subject matter muddies this neat delineation between expressive and
functional works. Copyright law protects software code because it is a kind of
written expression.149 But its economic value “is completely derived from the
functional ends facilitated by the software.”150 Also, while most copyrighted
or pursue certain areas of inquiry”); see also Harris, supra note 15 (arguing that “fair use has proven inadequate”
to protect First Amendment speech interests and proposing that misuse “be expanded as a device to protect
speech”).
145
Olson, supra note 15, at 539.
146
See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (considering a software license agreement that prohibited users from “reverse engineer[ing], deriv[ing]
source code, modify[ing], disassembl[ing] . . . [and] decompil[ing]” the program without the copyright owner’s
consent).
147
See generally Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 907–09; David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private
Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 557–58 (1992) (criticizing reverse engineering restrictions in the software license
context); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE
L.J. 1575, 1582 (2002) (describing various social benefits of reverse engineering).
148
See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 911.
149
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (protecting “literary works”). For a helpful summary of the history of
software protection under patent, copyright, and trade secret laws, see generally Michael Risch, Hidden in Plain
Sight, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1635 (2016).
150
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 912.
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works are discernable to the naked eye or ear, software is distributed in an
“object code” format that a computer can understand but a human cannot.151
Comprehending software requires a process of translating object code into
human-readable “source code”—that is, reverse engineering it.152 Reverse
engineering software usually requires copying object code into a computer’s
memory.153 This copying violates the owner’s copyright unless it qualifies as
fair use.154
Courts have found reverse engineering software to be fair use where it is
necessary “to gain access to the [unprotectable] ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program,” and where the defendant has a
legitimate reason for seeking such access,” like creating non-infringing
interoperable products.155 For example, in the oft-cited Ninth Circuit case, Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,156 Sega manufactured a video game console,
copyrighting the computer code.157 Accolade made non-infringing games that
were compatible with Sega’s game console.158 Accolade’s innovation process
required reverse engineering and copying Sega’s code.159 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Accolade’s “intermediate” copying of Sega’s code was fair use,
because reverse engineering was the only way to access the underlying
functional concepts.160 The court also emphasized the social value of reverse
engineering in this context, observing: “Accolade’s identification of the
functional requirements for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the

151
Id. at 907, 909 (observing that “object code is unique in copyright law in that it has no perceptible
expression” and that the “hidden nature of object code . . . creates friction with a core premise of copyright law,
namely that producers will distribute expressive works to the public”); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he fact that computer programs are distributed for public use in
object code form often precludes public access to the ideas and functional concepts contained in those programs,
and thus confers on the copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts.”).
152
See Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599–600 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing
methods of reverse engineering software).
153
See id.
154
See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 910.
155
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1527; see also Sony Comput. Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602 (finding that copying
necessary “for the purpose of gaining access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s software” was fair use). The
controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which makes it illegal to circumvent technological
measures designed to prevent unauthorized uses of copyrighted digital works, includes certain reverse
engineering exceptions for “achieve[ing] interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2012).
156
977 F.2d at 1527–28.
157
Id. at 1514.
158
Id. at 1514–15.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1522 (“Accolade copies Sega’s software solely in order to discover the functional requirements
for compatibility with the Genesis console—aspects of Sega’s programs that are not protected by copyright.”).
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number of independently designed video game programs . . . . It is precisely this
growth in creative expression . . . that the Copyright Act was intended to
promote.”161
Sega and similar software cases are often cited for the proposition that fair
use insulates software reverse engineers from copyright liability. However, these
cases did not address licensing agreements that prohibited reverse engineering.
Just as the fair use doctrine does not prevent copyright owners from restricting
critical speech in licensing agreements, it does not stop copyright owners from
restricting reverse engineering.162 In spite of fair use’s protections (or rather,
because of them), copyright owners routinely condition access to software on
the user’s agreement to avoid all forms of reverse engineering.163 Such
prohibitions can preemptively constrain socially valuable reverse engineering—
for example, where done to create interoperable products.
Acknowledging these insufficiencies of fair use doctrine, Professor Brett
Frischmann and Dan Moylan have argued that copyright misuse should
complement fair use’s protection of reverse engineering.164 While Frischmann
and Moylan generally support “antitrust-based misuse,” they suggest a narrow
“per se” misuse rule against reverse engineering license restrictions to
supplement copyright fair use.165 Such a misuse rule “can complement fair use
in restoring the public benefits inherent in copyright law . . . [and] reinvigorate
downstream innovation in software development.166
Despite scholarly support for misuse’s expanded role to protect reverse
engineering, few federal cases present a copyright misuse challenge to reverse
engineering restrictions. In Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway,
Inc., for example, the defendant raised both fair use and copyright misuse
161
Id. at 1523. The court took a similar view in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). In Sony, the defendant reverse engineered Sony’s BIOS software program to
create emulator software that enabled Sony PlayStation games to be played on computers. Id. at 598–99. Here,
too, the intermediate copying was deemed fair use, despite the fact that the defendant was a competitor of Sony
whose non-infringing products could cause “some economic loss” to Sony. Id. at 607.
162
See Frishmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 925 (observing that the “fair use defense does not preclude
software developers from imposing higher technical and legal barriers against reverse engineering”).
163
Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer
Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 269–70 (2013) (using empirical methods to demonstrate that
reverse engineering restrictions in software licenses have increased over time).
164
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 15, at 925.
165
Id. at 931.
166
Id. at 925; see also Julie Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1198 (1995) (“License
agreements that restrict the development of interoperable products . . . should be scrutinized carefully to ensure
that they do not have the opposite effect.”).
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arguments to challenge software license restrictions on reverse engineering.167
The court rejected the fair use argument, finding that the defendants “waived
their fair use right to reverse engineer by agreeing to the license agreement.”168
As for copyright misuse, the court was reluctant to look beyond the procedural
posture of the case because the plaintiff was suing under a breach of contract
theory rather than copyright infringement.169 The court noted, however, that if it
were to address the merits, it viewed the plaintiff’s reverse engineering
prohibitions to be less anticompetitive than the restrictions in Lasercomb.170
C. Channeling Between Patent and Copyright Subject Matter
Courts have also invoked copyright misuse to police the functional subject
matter boundary between patent and copyright. Software, of course, traverses
this boundary in some troublesome ways described above. But software aside,
IP laws have certain boundary-policing doctrines to protect patent law’s primacy
over functional subject matter.171 Protecting patent law’s domain is important,
since the exclusive rights it provides over functional subject matter are harder to
get and expire more quickly than copyrights.172 The higher substantive hurdles
and shorter duration for patent rights are an intentional IP design choice; it
reflects the fact that “[w]hen IP law grants protection to useful or functional
features of a product . . . it can convey substantial market power” that often
translates to higher costs for consumers and subsequent innovators.173
Despite patents’ primary role in protecting functionality, creators may
nonetheless try to use copyright law to protect functionality—i.e., to “obtain the
equivalent of a utility patent without having to do the work required to get
one.”174 Copyright law tries to prevent this form of “back-door“ patenting by
167
168
169

334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180–81 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1182–83 (noting that the court was “reluctant to apply the copyright misuse defense to a contract

claim”).
170
Id. at 1182 (“[T]he language used does not prevent defendants from competing with Blizzard by
prohibiting them or their employees from developing video game software as in Lasercomb . . . .”); see also
Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 337 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting a copyright misuse
argument based on a reverse engineering restriction in a software license agreement). Even outside of misuse
arguments, courts are generally unwilling to invalidate reverse engineering restrictions on other grounds, like
contract non-enforcement doctrines or copyright preemption. See Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade SecretContract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018).
171
See Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293, 1304–
05 (2017) (defining functionality as “things that make a product work at all, or work better, or with fewer defects,
or more cheaply”).
172
See id. at 1295; see also text accompanying notes 33–38.
173
Christopher Buccafusco et al., Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75, 78 (2018).
174
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 171, at 1295, 1300.
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imposing certain restrictions,175 such as the limitation on copyrighting “useful
articles”176 and the exclusion of underlying processes, systems, and methods
depicted in copyrighted works from the scope of copyright protection.177 These
doctrinal limits—which some scholars have termed “functionality screens,”
“boundary screens,” or “channeling doctrines”—“prevent creators from
characterizing things that belong in the utility patent realm as being
copyrightable.”178 Largely absent from this literature, however, is a discussion
of copyright misuse’s role.179
The Fifth Circuit invoked this channeling or boundary-screening role for
copyright misuse in a pair of decisions involving telecommunications software.
In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., the copyright owner licensed
copyrighted software on the condition that licensees only use it with certain
175

Buccafusco et al., supra note 173, at 85.
Copyright’s useful article doctrine denies copyright protection to functional aspects of threedimensional sculptural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.
Ct. 1002, 1005 (2017) (articulating a two-part test for the useful article doctrine); Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v.
Gardendance, Inc., No. C 04-1664 SBA, 2005 WL 1806369, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005) (“The useful article
doctrine serves the important policy of keeping patent and copyright separate by preventing parties from using
copyright to obtain a ‘backdoor patent’ on a functional article that cannot be patented.”).
177
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”); see also Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (preventing copyright law from protecting a functional method described in a literary work);
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the yoga sequence described in books was a “system or method” not protectable under copyright law and
that “protection is more properly sought through the patent process”); cf. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750
F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (seeming to endorse overlapping copyright and patent protection for functional
elements of software, such as application programming interfaces (APIs)).
178
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 171, at 1304 (using the terms “functionality doctrine” and
“functionality screen”). For a sampling of this literature, see, for example, id.; Buccafusco et al., supra note 173;
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (2017) (describing
functionality screens as a subset of intellectual property’s “boundary screens,” which “keep the goods that should
be protected by a first regime from infiltrating a second regime and upsetting the competition/protection balance
for that type of good that Congress struck in the first place”); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 492
(2017); Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 615 (2014); Viva R. Moffat,
Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of
Copyright and Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1494 (2017). Similarly, trademark law’s
functionality doctrine “serves primarily to identify features which are properly the subject of patent law rather
than trademark law and channel protection of those features to the patent system.” Mark P. McKenna, An
Alternative Approach to Channeling, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2009); see also Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (warning against “over-extension of trademark and
related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright”).
179
Cf. Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights Versus
Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 268 (2013) (describing courts’ invocation of misuse when
they “sense that plaintiffs are attempting an end-run around the limitations of a particular legal doctrine”).
176
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hardware (“switching cards”) manufactured by the copyright owner.180 The Fifth
Circuit invoked the patent-copyright boundary in deeming this licensing
restriction (a tying requirement) copyright misuse: “DSC indirectly seeks to
obtain patent-like protection of its hardware—its microprocessor card—through
the enforcement of its software copyright.”181 In an earlier ruling on denial of a
preliminary injunction, the Fifth Circuit similarly observed: “DGI may well
prevail on the defense of copyright misuse because DSC seems to be attempting
to use its copyright to obtain a patent-like monopoly over unpatented
microprocessor cards.”182
More recently, courts invoked this boundary-policing or channeling function
of copyright misuse in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.183 Omega, a
luxury watchmaker, wanted to stop Costco’s importation and sale of Omega
watches that were lawfully purchased abroad.184 To prevent this, Omega
engraved a miniscule design on the back of its watches and claimed that Costco
was engaging in copyright infringement.185 In 2011, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Costco on the copyright infringement claim,
holding that Omega had misused its copyright in the engraved design by trying
to control the importation of the watches.186 As a useful article, the watch was
not copyrightable.187 While the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision affirmed on the
basis of the first sale doctrine,188 Judge Wardlaw’s lengthy concurrence
180

166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 793–94 (“Any competing microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone switches must
be compatible with DSC’s copyrighted operating system software. In order to ensure that its card is compatible,
a competitor such as DGI must test the card on a DSC phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making a
copy of DSC’s copyrighted operating system . . . . If DSC is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent
anyone from developing a competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.”).
182
DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600–01 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Jonas P.
Herrell, Note, The Copyright Misuse Doctrine’s Role in Open and Closed Technology Platforms, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 441, 487 (2011) (arguing that copyright misuse doctrine should be applied to “prevent software
companies from bootstrapping their copyrights . . . in order to gain protection over . . . hardware”).
183
776 F.3d 692, 703–04 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 04–
05443 TJH, 2011 WL 8492716, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011).
184
Omega, 776 F.3d at 694.
185
See id. at 694. Omega’s copyright infringement argument relied on a theory of national exhaustion. Id.
at 697. At the time of Omega’s lawsuit, it was unclear whether copyright’s doctrine of exhaustion/first sale
applied to “gray-market” goods purchased lawfully abroad and then sold domestically. Id.
186
See Omega, 2011 WL 8492716, at *2 (“Here, Omega concedes that a purpose of the copyrighted
Omega Globe Design was to control the importation and sale of its watches containing the design, as the watches
could not be copyrighted. Accordingly, Omega misused its copyright of the Omega Globe Design by leveraging
its limited monopoly in being able to control the importation of that design to control the importation of its
Seamaster watches.”).
187
Omega, 776 F.3d at 699 (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (“Because Omega’s watches are useful articles, they
are not copyrightable, with some possible exceptions not before us.”).
188
Id. at 693. This case has a long and convoluted history, taking place over nearly a decade, with several
181
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highlighted the channeling or boundary-policing role of copyright misuse. As
Judge Wardlaw observed: “Omega misused its copyright when it used its
intellectual property protection to obtain a copyright-like monopoly over
uncopyrightable Seamaster watches.”189 Courts have thus recognized, either
explicitly or implicitly, copyright misuse’s potential role in policing the patentcopyright boundary and protecting patent law’s primacy with regard to
functional subject matter.
D. Abusive Overclaiming of Copyright Scope
Courts have also invoked copyright misuse when owners try to “overclaim”
the legitimate scope of their copyrights—usually, by bringing meritless
litigation or making unfounded litigation threats. Unlike other applications of
misuse, this branch of caselaw does not focus on restrictive license terms so
much as abusive enforcement tactics. Given the costs of defending a copyright
suit, even the threat of litigation—like a misleading warning or a cease-anddesist letter—can deter parties from engaging in permissible activities.190
Numerous scholars have described this outsized potential for copyright owners
to chill legitimate conduct by threatening meritless litigation and
misrepresenting the scope of their rights.191
Cases that involve abusive overclaiming come in different flavors. The
copyright owner may assert a claim to subject matter that is clearly outside of
copyright’s purview, such as raw facts. Or the copyright owner may assert a

opinions issued along the way. Id. Between the district court’s decision in Omega and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision on appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the reach of copyright’s first sale doctrine in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). In Kirtsaeng, the Court held that goods lawfully purchased abroad
would be treated like domestic goods under the first sale doctrine. Id. at 520–25. Because of this, Omega’s right
to control the importation of its copyrighted Omega design expired after the authorized first sale abroad. Relying
primarily on Kirtsaeng, the Ninth Circuit’s majority decision affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in Omega and said little about misuse. See Omega, 776 F.3d at 694–95 (“[A]pplication of the first sale
doctrine disposes of Omega’s claim, resolves this case in Costco’s favor, and conclusively reaffirms that
copyright holders cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in the downstream market.”).
189
Omega, 776 F.3d at 703 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
190
See Olson, supra note 15, at 594 (“Because there is enough gray area in determining fair use, the cost
of defending a copyright infringement suit is high, and because a copyright holder can control whether and when
to sue, and when to dismiss a suit if it starts going against him, the mere threat of litigation will deter many uses
of copyrighted material that are fair as matter of law.”).
191
See, e.g., id.; Harris, supra note 15; Loren, supra note 15; William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair
Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1639, 1658 (2004) (describing the “problem
of overclaiming of copyright in situations in which asymmetrical stakes discourage a legal challenge to the
claim” and arguing that “[t]he doctrine of copyright misuse is thus applicable where litigation is threatened in
an effort to extract a licensing fee or other profit when there is no reasonable basis for supposing that the
threatener’s copyright has been infringed”).
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claim against a defendant whose use is expressly permitted by one of the
Copyright Act’s specific limitations or safe harbors—for example, a teacher
displaying a work during a face-to-face teaching activity.192 Or the copyright
owner may assert a claim against a defendant that is almost certain to prevail on
a defense, such as fair use.
In Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.,193 for example,
the copyright owner’s overclaiming related to unprotectable subject matter. The
plaintiff, Assessment Technologies (AT), owned copyrighted tax assessment
software.194 Various municipalities had licensed AT’s software and used it to
compile and store real estate tax assessment data.195 WIREdata wanted to access
the municipalities’ underlying tax assessment data—factual data that was not
itself copyrightable.196 The municipalities had refused WIREdata’s request,
however, because they were subject to broadly worded, restrictive licensing
agreements with AT and feared infringing AT’s software copyright by providing
the data.197 AT brought suit against WIREdata to block it from obtaining the tax
data. The district court granted AT a permanent injunction.198 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed, finding fault with a copyright owner’s attempt to
prevent its licensees from disclosing unprotectable data.199 The Seventh Circuit
held that AT’s copyright did not extend to the raw data collected by the
municipalities, and therefore, the municipalities could share the tax data
freely.200
While the case did not turn on misuse, Judge Posner nonetheless gave it a
strongly worded treatment in dicta:
The data in the municipalities’ tax-assessment databases are beyond
the scope of AT’s copyright. . . . The argument for applying copyright
misuse . . . is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to
obtain property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does
not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright
192
Sections 108–22 of the Copyright Act set out specific limitations on a copyright owner’s rights to
exclude. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–22 (2018). For example, § 110 permits the “performance or display of a work by
instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution, in a
classroom or similar place devoted to instruction.” Id. § 110; see also Loren, supra note 15, at 523 (arguing that
“a presumption of misuse should apply to a contractual clause” limiting activities permitted by §§ 108–22).
193
350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
194
Id. at 642.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
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victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.201

In an accompanying attorneys‘ fees decision, the Seventh Circuit reiterated this
point, stating: “We did not reach the question [of] whether the plaintiff’s conduct
rose to the level of actual copyright misuse, but we made clear that it came
close . . . .”202 More recent cases acknowledge that copyright misuse can occur
“where a copyright owner uses an infringement suit or threat of suit to obtain
protection that copyright law does not confer.”203
Outside of the unprotectable subject matter scenario, commentators have
advocated using copyright misuse to deter copyright owners from threatening
litigation against individuals who are engaging in “obvious fair use.”204
Professor Olson, for example, suggests that copyright defendants asserting
misuse “could enter evidence of any attempts by the copyright holder to chill
obvious fair use through use of litigation or threats of litigation.”205 Since any
copyright defendant can bring forth such evidence of an owner’s misuse, not just
the individual targets of the misuse, “copyright holders [will] think carefully
before being too aggressive in seeking to deter obvious fair use.”206

201
Id. at 647; see also id. at 646–47 (Posner, J.) (“To try by contract or otherwise to prevent the
municipalities from revealing their own data, especially when, as we have seen, the complete data are unavailable
anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse.”). Interestingly, in earlier decades, Judge Posner seemed to
support a more antitrust-aligned misuse doctrine. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816
F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (“If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what
principles shall they be tested?”).
202
Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004); see also qad.
Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (applying copyright misuse to a software
owner’s attempt to pass off unoriginal/derivative aspects of its software as original and then obtain injunctive
relief against competitors: “This improper extension and overstatement of qad’s copyrights is a misuse which
this Court should remedy by declaring qad’s copyrights unenforceable against ALN.”).
203
Nielsen Co. v. Truck Ads, LLC, No. 08 C 6446, 2011 WL 221838, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011); see
also Design Basics, LLC v. Petros Homes, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 712, 720–21 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (denying
plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on a copyright misuse defense where allegations centered on
copyright owner’s litigation and threats of litigation based unprotectable architectural design elements);
Huthwaite, Inc. v. Randstad Gen. Partner (U.S.), LLC, No. 06-C-1548, 2006 WL 3065470, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2006) (“[A]ttempting to use . . . copyrighted books to cover the unprotectable ideas within those books by
filing copyright infringement lawsuits and forcing companies . . . to either settle or incur litigation expenses”
constitutes copyright misuse.).
204
Olson, supra note 15, at 595 (arguing that this role for copyright misuse will “mak[e] it potentially
more costly for copyright owners to try to stop fair use”); see also Patry & Posner, supra note 191, at 1659
(“Exaggerating the substantive rights of a copyright owner by denying in effect the fair use privilege . . . seems
a[] . . . serious form of copyright overclaiming.”).
205
Olson, supra note 15, at 599.
206
Id. at 599–600.
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One well-publicized case, Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc.,207 provides
an example of overclaiming against obvious fair users. Although this case
involved a copyright owner’s abuse of notice and takedown procedures under
the DMCA,208 its facts are nonetheless illustrative. Diebold asserted copyright
claims to prevent the online publication of critical commentary regarding
security lapses with its electronic voting machines.209 As the court observed:
“No reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the portions of the
email archive discussing possible technical problems with Diebold’s voting
machines were protected by copyright,” as they were clearly subject to the fair
use exception.210 In other cases, however, it has proven harder to draw a clear
line in the sand between a copyright owner’s threat against an “obvious fair user”
and an aggressive-but-plausible assertion of copyright infringement. The
application of fair use doctrine is, after all, a fact-specific balancing exercise.211
Thus, by and large, courts have been justifiably cautious, hesitating to find
misuse where a copyright owner asserts a plausible infringement claim.212

207
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Sabrina Rubin Erdely, The Paperless Chase, MOTHER
JONES (May/June 2004), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/05/paperless-chase/.
208
Online Policy Grp., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1195–96. To a limited extent, the DMCA penalizes copyright
owners that knowingly overclaim copyright scope in the context of “notice and takedown procedures.” Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). A service provider, like YouTube or Google, can
avoid copyright infringement liability for storing users’ content if it “‘expeditiously’ removes or disables access
to the content after receiving notification from a copyright holder that the content is infringing.” Id. But the
DMCA penalizes copyright owners for making knowingly false accusations of copyright infringement that result
in the removal of online material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2018) (“Any person who knowingly materially
misrepresents under this section—(1) that material or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any
damages . . . .”). However, this provision has been rendered rather toothless by the requirement of “subjective”
bad faith, rather than an objective standard of reasonableness. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc.,
391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that copyright holder need only form a subjective good faith belief
that a use is not authorized to avoid liability under § 512(f)); Eric Goldman, It Takes a Default Judgment to Win
a 17 USC 512(f) Case – Automattic v. Steiner, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/03/it-takes-a-default-judgment-to-win-a-17-usc-512f-caseautomattic-v-steiner.htm (criticizing this subjective standard for 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)).
209
See Online Policy Grp., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1198–99.
210
Id. at 1204–05 (concluding that “Diebold knowingly materially misrepresented that Plaintiffs infringed
Diebold’s copyright interest, at least with respect to the portions of the email archive clearly subject to the fair
use exception. . . . Diebold sought to use the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions—which were designed to protect
ISPs, not copyright holders—as a sword to suppress publication of embarrassing content rather than as a shield
to protect its intellectual property”).
211
See supra text accompanying note 127.
212
See Nielsen Co. v. Truck Ads, LLC, No. 08 C 6446, 2011 WL 221838, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011)
(refusing to find misuse unless “the underlying infringement claim [is] wholly lacking in merit”); Metro–
Goldwyn–Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 998 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (declining to find
misuse where “music publishers aggressively demanded royalties for streaming,” explaining that acceptance of
the defendant’s “position that a copyright holder’s assertion of what it plausibly believes to be its rights under
an ambiguous statute can constitute copyright misuse . . . would turn the copyright law on its head”); Huthwaite,
Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., No. 05 C 3273, 2006 WL 929262, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2006) (“Claiming infringement by
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E. Understanding the Divergence of Patent and Copyright Misuse
Why has copyright misuse evolved differently from patent misuse? Some
commentators point to the diverging paths of patent and copyright misuse as
indicative of the doctrine’s overall incoherence, and counsel either a narrowing
of copyright misuse to mimic patent misuse’s antitrust-inspired focus on
competition harms or a scrapping of the misuse doctrine altogether.213 This
section suggests that the divergence is not indicative of doctrinal schizophrenia
or chaos, but rather can be explained by the notable differences between patent
and copyright—in terms of subject matter, structure, and audience. These
differences help justify a copyright misuse doctrine that focuses on a broader set
of concerns than patent misuse. And as Part III argues, because the structure of
trade secret law bears a number of similarities to copyright, the broader concerns
animating copyright misuse resonate in the trade secrecy context as well.
Patent law covers functional subject matter (e.g., devices), rather than
expressive works (e.g., literature).214 Thus, insofar as copyright misuse concerns
itself with reconciling First Amendment speech interests or preventing
functional works from getting “back-door” protection through copyright law,
these concerns are largely irrelevant to patent law.215 And insofar as copyright
misuse concerns itself with owners’ abusive overclaiming of copyright scope, it

a writing cannot possibly be copyright misuse unless the claim is patently frivolous.”); Advanced Comput. Servs.
of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 370 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that plaintiff’s aggressive
“enforcement of its copyrights does not constitute copyright misuse”); Patry & Posner, supra note 191, at 1659
(“[C]ourts must be careful not to place copyright owners on a razor’s edge, however, where a mistake in a
copyright warning precludes enforcement of the copyright . . . .”). Whether courts should delve deeper into a
copyright owner’s “ill-fitting” motivations for bringing suit—for example, to address reputational rather than
economic concerns—is an interesting question that is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Christopher
Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433,
2490–94 (2016) (advocating a constitutional affirmative defense where plaintiffs bring copyright infringement
lawsuits for “copyright-irrelevant harm”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property
Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 591–92 (2015) (describing misuse as a tool that courts have
at “their disposal to address ill-fitting motivations”); Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379, 395–96 (2016) (“[C]opyright misuse may be well-suited to stopping suspect
assertions of copyright.”).
213
See supra note 16.
214
See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
215
See supra Sections II.B–II.C; see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 234 (1998) (explaining that “making, using, or
selling machines, products or processes . . . aren’t activities that involve speech”); O’Rourke, supra note 3, at
1198 (“[P]atented inventions are simply not imbued with the same First Amendment interests that copyrighted
material tends to be . . . .”). But see Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents and Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309, 314 (2018)
(arguing that patent protection poses threats to free speech that merit additional safeguards, including an
expanded application of the patent misuse defense).
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is notable that copyright law lacks patent’s structural safeguards and specialized
audience.
In terms of structure, patent law requires patentees to formally apply for a
patent, claim the boundaries of their inventions, demonstrate novelty and
nonobviousness, and satisfy disclosure requirements like enablement and
written description.216 These requirements try to winnow out inventions
unworthy of a patent right and ensure that granted patent rights correspond to
inventors’ actual contributions.217 Moreover, these requirements provide some
degree of ex ante notice to competitors and the public about how far a patentee’s
right to exclude extends.218 And since the threat of invalidity looms over the
decision to bring meritless claims, patent owners “must be cautious about filing
suit, or even threatening suit, because the defendant can counterclaim that the
patent is invalid.”219 While these structural features of patent law do not
eliminate the problem of overclaiming,220 they offer some important checks on
abusive enforcement practices.
216

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
See MERGES ET AL, supra note 30, at 195 (describing the overclaiming concerns of § 112 requirements).
Patent’s inequitable conduct doctrine may also deter patent applicants from making material misrepresentations
to the PTO (e.g., regarding the novelty of a claimed invention) in the course of obtaining patents. See Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292–93 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
218
See 35 U.S.C. § 112. The question of how well patent claims perform their important notice function
is, however, a topic of scholarly debate. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8–9 (2008); Burk & Lemley, supra note
88 (arguing that the modern claiming system “isn’t working”).
219
Olson, supra note 15, at 604.
220
To be sure, ongoing legislative efforts to curb the tactics of patent assertion entities (PAEs) or “patent
trolls,” as they are pejoratively known, suggest that patent law has its own problems with abusive enforcement
practices. PAEs do not practice patents themselves, but instead, purchase patents of dubious value from other
companies to force businesses or individuals into licensing agreements and settlements. It is unclear whether
current patent misuse doctrine would apply to such litigation tactics. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at *11 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (explaining that
the patent assertion entity’s enforcement tactics did not amount to misuse); cf. Lim, supra note 15, at 369
(suggesting that “[p]atent misuse may find its second wind in the wake of controversial practices by patent
assertion entities”). Because 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012) provides that “no patent owner otherwise entitled to
relief for infringement . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of misuse . . . by reason of having . . . sought to enforce
his patent rights . . .,” some courts have been skeptical of misuse arguments based on a patent holder’s
enforcement activities. See IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.03[I] (citing cases). The Federal Circuit
treats patent misuse arguments based on enforcement tactics similar to antitrust claims based on sham litigation.
See Glaverbel S.A. v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1558–59 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The bringing
of a lawsuit to enforce legal rights does not of itself constitute violation of the antitrust laws or patent misuse;
there must be bad faith and improper purpose in bringing the suit, in implementation of an illegal restraint of
trade.”). An antitrust “sham litigation” suit requires a demonstration that the IP owner has market power. See
infra note 313. Patent misuse doctrine aside, some states have recently enacted legislation to deter PAEs from
engaging in abusive litigation tactics. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-770 (West Supp. 2018) (Georgia’s “bad
faith assertions of patent infringement” provision); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 446.161 (West Supp. 2018)
(Michigan’s “bad-faith patent infringement claims act”).
217
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Copyright law lacks similar safeguards. Notably, copyright law imposes no
formal application process, claiming requirements, or disclosure obligations on
putative owners.221 Thus, in contrast to patent law—where patentees must try to
“define the entitlement sharply ex ante for all the world to see”—copyright law
ensures that “[o]bservers bear the costs of determining what constitutes the
protected expression.”222 And because copyright requirements are so minimal,
no comparable invalidity threat tempers an owner’s decision to go after users on
the basis of dubious infringement claims.
In addition, notable differences in the audience for patents and copyrights
can exacerbate copyright owners’ propensity to overclaim. As Professor Clarissa
Long has explained, the “average observer of patented goods has greater
knowledge of the [relevant] field and a higher tolerance of information costs
than the average observer of copyrighted goods.”223 The audience for copyrights
tends to be larger and more heterogeneous than the more technically adept
audience for patents. Copyrighted goods (e.g., novels, books, movies) impact
many observers who are “not interested in understanding detailed [information]”
about the precise boundaries of a copyright.224 Copyright law’s combination of
no application requirement, limited ex ante notice of boundaries, and more
information cost-avoidant audience, makes it easier for owners to engage in
abusive overclaiming practices—and increases the likelihood that permissible
uses of information will be deterred. As the next Part demonstrates, trade secret
law shares many of these characteristics with copyright.
III. CONSIDERING A TRADE SECRET MISUSE DOCTRINE
The previous Part considered copyright misuse’s divergence from patent
misuse to embrace a broader set of policy concerns. Courts use copyright misuse
doctrine to scrutinize an owner’s acts that not only pose demonstrable
anticompetitive effects, but also those that: (i) suppress socially valuable fair
uses, like critical speech and reverse engineering, (ii) try to evade the boundary
between copyright and patent, or (iii) “overclaim” the legitimate scope of
copyright, usually through unfounded litigation threats against parties that “lack
the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively.”225

221
222
223
224
225

See supra text accompanying note 34.
Clarissa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 484, 500–02 (2004).
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 508.
Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
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What of trade secret law, then? Trade secret law covers a vast array of
information that companies take reasonable steps to keep secret. This includes
both technical information that can overlap with patentable subject matter (e.g.,
mechanical processes and chemical formulas), as well as business-related
information (e.g., customer lists, marketing plans and pricing data). In modern
times, trade secrets are increasingly categorized as a subset of IP, with
innovation-promoting rationales similar to patents and copyrights.226 Thus, all
three IP doctrines—patent, copyright, and trade secret—are primarily justified
as mechanisms to encourage the invention and creation of information-based
goods.227 And yet, courts did not develop a comparable trade secret misuse
doctrine.228
Perhaps courts did not develop an analogous misuse doctrine because trade
secrecy’s historical origins differ from patent and copyright. In deciding to
import misuse doctrine into copyright law, the Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb
emphasized the similar historical roots and constitutional underpinnings of
patent and copyright laws.229 Trade secrecy’s origins do not match up so neatly,
however. While Congress’s power to enact patent and copyright laws stem from
the same constitutional provision,230 the legal recognition of trade secrets grew

226
See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 73–98 (2006) (listing cases describing trade
secrets as property and intellectual property); David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64 (1991) (explaining that trade secrecy “supplements the patent system” and “is congruent
with the basic economic explanation for patent protection—that it provides a means of internalizing the benefits
of innovation”); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 324–25 (2008) (arguing that trade secrets are best conceptualized as intellectual property). But cf.
Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1807–08 (2014)
(expressing skepticism that “trade secret law generates incentive benefits that exceed its costs”).
227
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1974) (“Trade secret law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with
the discovery and exploitation of his invention.”); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir.
1984) (“The primary purpose of trade secret law is to encourage innovation and development . . . .”); MERGES
ET AL., supra note 30, at 11 (“The principal objective of much of intellectual property law is the promotion of
new and improved works—whether technological or expressive. This purpose encompasses patent, copyright,
and trade secret law . . . .”). Though some courts have also emphasized a commercial morality rationale for trade
secret law. See, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (observing that in addition to promoting innovation, “[t]he
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” is an additional “polic[y] behind trade secret law”); E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
228
While an analogous trade secret misuse doctrine does not currently exist, at least one Federal Circuit
decision suggests a willingness to consider the “defense of . . . trade secret misuse,” had the defendant in the
case raised it in a timely manner. Glitsch, Inc.v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
229
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The origins of patent and
copyright law in England, the treatment of these two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of our
Constitution, and the later statutory and judicial development of patent and copyright law in this country
persuade us that parallel public policies underlie the protection of both types of intellectual property rights.”).
230
See supra note 31.
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out of nineteenth century common law and unfair competition principles.231
Also, given patent misuse’s increased intersection with antitrust, courts may
have been reluctant to import a misuse doctrine into trade secrecy. Compared to
patents, trade secrets provide less propensity for market dominance.232 But even
though a trade secret misuse doctrine did not develop organically, this Part
demonstrates that many of the concerns motivating copyright misuse resonate in
the trade secret context. Given these similarities, this Part then considers whether
a misuse doctrine would be a useful policy lever in trade secret law.
A. Understanding Trade Secret Law
Almost every state has enacted some version of the UTSA.233 In 2016,
Congress introduced a new federal civil claim for trade secret misappropriation,
the DTSA, which largely echoes the UTSA.234 Although trade secret’s technical
subject matter can overlap with patent, its structure is very similar to copyright
law. Like copyright law, trade secret law does not require putative owners to
formally apply for protection or claim the boundaries of trade secrets.
Consequently, the boundaries of trade secrets are highly uncertain ex ante, and
thorny issues of validity and scope do not get sorted out until litigation.235
231
For a detailed history of the evolution of trade secret law in the United States, see generally Sharon K.
Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010).
232
See, e.g., Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 766 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977) (Larson, J.,
dissenting) (“I think it unnecessary to discuss [the trade secret misuse] theory in much detail; the patent misuse
doctrine is to prevent a party from using his extraordinary legislative grant of exclusivity as leverage to extend
the benefits he has obtained. The trade secret owner has no such leverage; he cannot guarantee his licensees
freedom from encroachment by others.”). Similar perceptions of the relative weakness of a trademark right
compared to patent right have led courts to reject trademark misuse arguments. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling
Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F.
Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)) (“[A] trademark, unlike other intellectual property rights, does not confer a
legal monopoly on any good or idea; it confers rights to a name only. Because a trademark ‘merely enables the
owner to bar others from the use of the mark, as distinguished from competitive manufacture and sale of identical
goods bearing another mark, the opportunity for effective antitrust misuse of a trademark . . . is so limited that
it poses a far less serious threat to the economic health of the nation [than patent misuse].’”).
233
The UTSA, a model state statute, was issued by the National Conference of Commissioners in 1979
and has since been enacted in nearly every state. See supra text accompanying note 27. More recently, the 1995
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition describes the principles of trade secret law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). It is largely consistent with the UTSA. See,
e.g., James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the
Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV 1045, 1051 (2016).
234
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2018); see supra text accompanying note 28. For a discussion of the similarities
and differences between the DTSA and UTSA, see Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a
Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017).
235
See Orly Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV.
369, 375 (2017) (“Given their expansive, open-ended definition, trade secrets are the broadest type of intellectual
property. Because of their ‘do-it-yourself’ nature, which does not require application or registration, trade secrets
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Under state or federal trade secret laws, a successful trade secret plaintiff
must satisfy three elements. First, the information at issue must be protectable
subject matter—meaning, it has “independent economic value, actual or
potential,” and is not “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” by others in
the field.236 Thus, any competitor can use published or well-known industry
information.237 In addition, trade secret owners must engage in “reasonable”
efforts to keep the information secret.238 These measures can include physical
and contractual means to protect the information’s confidentiality.239 If the
subject matter and reasonable efforts elements are satisfied, the plaintiff has a
valid trade secret. A trade secret has no fixed term, but protection expires if the
secret information becomes publicly available (e.g., published in a patent).240
The lack of fixed term means that trade secrets can, in theory, be protected
indefinitely—as exemplified by the over-century-old Coca-Cola formula.241
Finally, a successful plaintiff must show that the defendant acquired, used,
or disclosed the information by breaching a duty of confidence or through
“improper means.”242 Defendants who use proper means to acquire
information—like independently creating it or reverse engineering a lawfully
acquired product—are insulated from liability.243 The vast majority of trade
secret cases involve defendants that use or disclose information in violation of a
confidentiality duty. These defendants have typically worked with the trade
secret owner in some capacity—as employees, former employees, or business

do not come with a disclosure or enablement requirement like patent law.”).
236
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (defining “trade secret” as:
“information, including a formula, pattern, . . . or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (imposing similar
requirements under federal law).
237
See Lemley, supra note 226, at 317.
238
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
239
For a discussion of this requirement and the reasons behind it, see generally Deepa Varadarajan, Trade
Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (2017).
240
See MILGRIM, supra note 226, at § 1.05.
241
See R. Mark Halligan & David A. Haas, The Secret of Trade Secret Success, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2010,
8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/02/19/protecting-trade-secrets-leadership-managing-halligan-haas.
html#120bc1f1372e.
242
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (defining “misappropriation” as
“acquisition of a trade secret . . . by improper means” or “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who . . . acquired [it] under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (similarly defining misappropriation under federal law).
243
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990).
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partners.244 Trade secret liability also applies to third parties who use or disclose
information that they “knew or had reason to know” was misappropriated.245 A
successful trade secret plaintiff can obtain various remedies, including
injunctive relief and monetary damages.246
B. Copyright Misuse’s Concerns Are Relevant to Trade Secret Law
As previously discussed, copyright misuse offers courts a mechanism to ask
important questions that are insufficiently addressed by other doctrinal vehicles:
(1) Does a plaintiff’s acts pose competitive harms unlikely to be addressed by
antitrust’s rule of reason standard?; (2) Is a plaintiff’s licensing condition too
restrictive of socially valuable acts, like critical speech and reverse engineering?;
(3) Is a plaintiff using copyright to obtain protection over functional subject
matter that is best channeled into the patent system?; (4) Is a plaintiff engaging
in abusive overclaiming—for example, by threatening litigation to deter uses of
unprotectable subject matter. The sections that follow demonstrate that many of
these concerns underlying copyright misuse are relevant to the trade secret
context. And in the absence of a trade secret misuse doctrine, defendants are left
with ill-fitting doctrinal substitutes to address these concerns.
1. Competition Harms and Antitrust’s Limitations
Like other forms of IP licensing, trade secret licensing practices are subject
to antitrust scrutiny.247 However, the “the antitrust treatment of trade secrets has
remained largely hidden,” subject only to “scarce” commentary.248 Like
copyrights, trade secrets are generally not viewed as conferring market power.249
244
See Ameling et al., supra note 22, at 69. “Improper means” cases are unusual; they tend to involve
persons unknown to the plaintiff engaged in unlawful acts like wiretapping, or acts that fall below “generally
accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct,” like aerial spying. See E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
245
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
246
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); see
also Lemley, supra note 226, at 319 (explaining that “trade secret misappropriation gives rise to a panoply of
remedies”).
247
See 2017 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 3; MELVIN JAGER, 2 TRADE SECRETS LAW § 11:1 (2016) (“Th[e]
interface between trade secret and antitrust law usually occurs in the preparation and enforcement of agreements
dealing with the licensing or transfer of trade secrets.”).
248
Harry First, Trade Secrets and Antitrust Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 332, 332 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds.,
2011).
249
See IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 3.5[A] (“[T]rade secret law provide[s] generally weaker
intellectual property rights than patent and copyright law, at least from the perspective of dominance of an
economic market.”); JAGER, supra note 247, at § 11:2 (describing a trade secret’s lesser potential for “monopoly
power” than a patent); cf. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus. Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th Cir. 2011)
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Thus, while “a trade secret owner does not have carte blanche” to craft contract
terms, at least one commentator has suggested that “federal antitrust laws are
applied with less vigor to a trade secret license than to a patent license.”250
Yet it is worth asking—as courts and commentators have asked in other IP
contexts—whether certain activities of trade secret owners threaten competition
in ways that escape antitrust’s rule of reason standard.251 Particularly in software
cases, the absence of a trade secret misuse doctrine can lead to discordant results.
Software licenses are often premised on both copyright and trade secret rights.252
A licensing condition deemed copyright misuse because of its competitive
harms could nonetheless survive trade secret litigation unscathed.
In Lasercomb, for example, the copyright owner prevented software
licensees from developing or assisting in the development of die-making
software for a ninety-nine-year period.253 Citing competition and other concerns,
the court applied copyright misuse to deny plaintiff’s copyright infringement
claim.254 But suppose the same restrictions had been linked to the licensing of
trade secrets rather than copyright—or both. Even if Lasercomb’s misuse
negated a finding of copyright infringement, the defendant’s liability for trade
secret misappropriation would be unaffected.255 Given the panoply of remedies
(finding market power where DuPont, the trade secret owner, controlled over 70% of the U.S. para-aramid fiber
market); First, supra note 248, at 357 (“It is certainly possible that a trade secret could be sufficiently strong to
confer market power on its possessor.”).
250
JAGER, supra note 247, at § 11:2; cf. First, supra note 248, at 333 (arguing that “[t]here is no inherent
reason for trade secrets to have escaped antitrust scrutiny . . . [and that] the arguments for according deference
to the use of confidential trade secret information are . . . far weaker[] than the arguments for according such
deference to the holders of either patents or copyrights”).
251
Whether antitrust law itself should be flexible enough to assess such competitive harms is an interesting
question but is beyond the scope of this Article. See Thomas F. Cotter, IP Misuse and Innovation Harm, 96
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 52, 58 (2011) (questioning whether antitrust law should be reformed to “loosen up some of
its concerns over false positives”).
252
See GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 707–09 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing the
intersection between copyright and trade secret laws’ protection of software); Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP’s
Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 241–43 (2006)
(discussing the protection of software code under trade secret law); Risch, supra note 149, at 1646 (“Operation
of a computer program, if it otherwise satisfies the requirements of the statute, falls squarely within . . . the
definition [of a trade secret].”).
253
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
254
See supra text accompanying notes 59–70.
255
See Risch, supra note 149, at 1654–55 (discussing the limitations of Lasercomb’s holding for the trade
secret software licensing scenario); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Data
General, the plaintiff’s software was protected by both copyright and trade secret. Id. at 1152. To use the
software, consumers had to agree to a license provision preventing them from utilizing any of plaintiff’s
competitors in the services market. Id. at 1154–55. The defendant Grumman was a competitor in the services
market. Id. at 1152. Grumman raised antitrust claims, as well as “misuse” arguments in defense of both the
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available under trade secret law, including injunctive relief, a plaintiff could
accomplish the same anticompetitive ends through trade secret litigation—even
if copyright misuse condemned those very acts. Thus, to the extent copyright
misuse cares about competitive harms that are likely to be unaddressed by
antitrust principles, trade secret law arguably should too—at least in the software
context.
2. Restraining Socially Valuable Uses
Trade secret law does not have a fair use doctrine akin to copyright.256 It
does, however, have a robust reverse engineering limitation, which has been
described as trade secrecy’s fair use counterpart.257 And while trade secret law
has been largely inattentive to speech concerns (too inattentive, as this Author
has previously argued),258 the recently enacted DTSA incorporates new
whistleblower provisions to protect certain forms of socially valuable speech.259
Misuse doctrine can act as a useful supplement or backstop to these fair use-light
doctrines, akin to copyright misuse’s relationship with fair use.
a. Critical Speech
Since trade secrets often cover technical information rather than creative
works, speech concerns have been largely overlooked.260 In recent years,
however, firms’ use of trade secret law to prevent or intimidate employees from
engaging in whistleblowing speech has garnered more attention.261
copyright and trade secret claims. Id. The Court found insufficient proof of an antitrust violation. Id. The Court
did not view the misuse arguments to be distinct from antitrust, and consequently, dismissed those as well. Id.
But even if the court had applied a broader, Lasercomb-like view of copyright misuse, the trade secret claim
would have been unaffected. Id. at 1169–70.
256
See Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1404 (“Unlike copyright . . . trade secret law lacks limiting doctrines
sufficiently attuned to a defendant’s follow-on improvements or to First Amendment interests, like creating a
well-informed citizenry and fostering open debate over matters of public interest.”).
257
See Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328 (2005) (noting the “counterpart to fair use in trade
secret law is the right to unmask a trade secret by reverse engineering”).
258
See Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1404.
259
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (2018); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Snapshot of Trade Secret Developments,
60 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 45, 78 (2019) (describing the DTSA’s “whistleblower defense” as “the newest
defense to a trade secret misappropriation claim . . . which applies to all potential criminal and civil trade secret
liability, state or federal”).
260
See Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1434–36 (describing the “general reluctance of courts to consider
speech concerns in trade secret cases”); see also Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between
Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 778 (2007) (discussing conflicts between trade
secret law and the First Amendment).
261
See Menell, supra note 25, at 45 (explaining the ”imperative to establish a clear safe harbor within
trade secret law for employees, contractors, and any other signatories of NDAs to communicate evidence of
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Whistleblowing speech—for example, when an employee or business partner
reports confidential information about a firm’s suspected unlawful activities—
has vital consequences for public health and safety.262 In recognition of trade
secret law’s somewhat anemic protection for this kind of critical speech,263
Congress drafted explicit provisions in the DTSA to protect whistleblowers.
The DTSA immunizes whistleblowers from liability “under any Federal or
State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret” when they report
confidential information to government officials or attorneys “solely for the
purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law.”264 The DTSA
also requires trade secret owners to provide notice of this immunity in “any
contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or
other confidential information.”265 The senators that introduced these provisions
emphasized the need to “ensure that employers and other entities cannot bully
whistleblowers or other litigants by threatening them with a lawsuit for trade
secret theft.”266
Yet trade secret owners impose broad non-disclosure restrictions on
employees, licensees, and other recipients of trade secret information, and
engage in enforcement practices that can undercut the beneficial effects of these
whistleblowing provisions.267 The DTSA specifies a penalty for failing to give
employees notice about these immunity provisions: the “employer may not be
awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees” in a trade secret action brought
“against an employee to whom notice was not provided.”268 The statute specifies
possible illegal conduct to the government without risk of negative repercussions”).
262
See id. at 6–7 (describing several examples).
263
The UTSA does not explicitly protect whistleblower speech. While the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition recognizes courts’ ability to balance a trade secret owner’s rights against disclosures serving the
public interest, it is merely guidance that is not binding on courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (observing that “the disclosure of another’s trade secret for
purposes other than commercial exploitation may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance
another significant public interest” and that “a privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection
with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or
tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern”).
264
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A).
265
Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A). The statute undercuts this notice requirement somewhat by stating that “an
employer shall be considered to be in compliance with the notice requirement . . . if the employer provides a
cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer’s reporting policy
for a suspected violation of law.” Id. § 1833(b)(3)(B).
266
162 CONG. REC. S1636 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy). For a detailed discussion of
the legislative history behind these whistleblower provisions, see Peter S. Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act
Whistleblower Immunity Provision: A Legislative History, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 398, 398
(2017).
267
See, e.g., Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D. Mass. 2016).
268
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
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no penalty, however, for threatening whistleblowers with litigation in spite of
these provisions.269 Nor is it clear how the DTSA’s whistleblower immunity
provisions, which are specific to “Federal [and] State trade secret law,”270 apply
to situations where a trade secret owner asserts a breach of contract claim against
a potential whistleblower for violating of a non-disclosure contract, instead of a
trade secret misappropriation claim.
Given how recently these immunity provisions have been enacted, it remains
to be seen how meaningful a deterrent they will be to trade secret owners’
speech-restraining practices.271 At least one commentator has already expressed
concern that courts are “misconstru[ing] the immunity provision, creating the
very [speech-]chilling effects” that the provision was meant to deter.272 A trade
secret misuse doctrine could raise the stakes for employers that engage in
contractual or enforcement practices to undercut whistleblower speech. If the
price for such activity included being unable to enforce a trade secret for a period
of time, trade secret owners would have greater incentive to refrain from such
speech-chilling behavior and to adhere to the DTSA’s notice provisions.273 In
this way, a trade secret misuse doctrine could buttress the DTSA’s whistleblower
defense—not unlike copyright misuse’s complementary role to fair use.
Even outside of the whistleblowing context, trade secret owners use
contractual restrictions and litigation threats to suppress critical speech
regarding public health, safety, and other issues of important public interest.274
In previous work, this Author has argued that a fair use doctrine for trade secret

269
A whistleblower defendant would presumably be entitled to collect attorney’s fees for having to defend
a “bad faith” misappropriation claim. See infra text accompanying note 313.
270
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A).
271
See Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 1
NEV. L.J.F. 92, 95 (2017) (criticizing recent caselaw for treating the whistleblowing provisions as an affirmative
defense, rather than immunity from liability).
272
See Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act,
C.L.S. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/03/misconstruingwhistleblower-immunity-under-the-defend-trade-secrets-act/.
273
See Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13,
2017) (“It is . . . undisputed that Xoran did not provide notice of employee whistleblower immunity provisions
in the Employment Agreement (or elsewhere).”).
274
Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1441–44; see, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and HighTech Devices: How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 188 (2009); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 139–40 (2007); Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an
Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 466–67 (2007); Frank Pasquale, The Troubling Consequences of Trade Secret
Protection of Search Engine Rankings, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 381, 382 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
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law would benefit society in these situations.275 Short of a more robust fair use
doctrine, however, a trade secret misuse doctrine could provide a check on
socially harmful speech restrictions. The absence of a fair use defense in trade
secret law makes the development of an equitable backstop like misuse
potentially more pressing.

b. Reverse Engineering
The ability to reverse engineer—that is, “starting with the known product
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture”276—is one of the most significant limitations on owners’ trade
secret rights.277 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, reverse engineering is
“an essential part of innovation” that “may lead to significant advances in the
field.”278 In holding that federal patent law did not preempt state trade secrecy
laws, the Supreme Court highlighted how the reverse engineering limitation
made trade secrecy protection “far weaker” than a patent.279
While any trade secret licensing agreement can potentially include
restrictions on reverse engineering, such restrictions are particularly prevalent in
the software licensing context. Professor Michael Risch describes “no reverse
engineering” clauses as “relatively standard” in software license agreements.280
Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and Robert Taylor demonstrate that such
restrictions have become more common over time—and posit that the increase
is due to increased judicial enforcement of such restrictions.281 Legal challenges
to reverse engineering restrictions have generally been unsuccessful.282

275

See Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1404.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
277
Id.; see also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990).
278
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (“[A]s we noted in Kewanee,
the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to develop
inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.” (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489–90)).
279
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489–90; see also Chi. Lock. Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that imposing an obligation not to reverse engineer “upon the lock owners in this case would, in
effect, convert the Company’s trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin to the absolute protection that
a federal patent affords. Such an extension of California trade secrets law would certainly be preempted by the
federal scheme of patent regulation”).
280
Risch, supra note 149, at 1652.
281
See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 163, at 273–74.
282
See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a
prohibition on reverse engineering in mass-market software license agreement); Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v.
Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (“The defendants in this case waived their
‘fair use’ right to reverse engineer by agreeing to the license agreement.”).
276
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Where reverse engineering restrictions are linked to the trade secretprotected aspects of software, they raise similar innovation concerns to those in
a copyright context.283 And allowing reverse engineering restrictions to go
unchecked raises an additional concern in the trade secret context—it can
undermine federal patent policy. Professor David Rice, for example, has
critiqued the pervasive incorporation of reverse engineering prohibitions in
software distribution contracts as restraining innovative conduct that was
“absolutely critical” to the Supreme Court’s upholding of state trade secret laws
over patent preemption arguments.284 This additional concern—about the
relationship between trade secret limitations and federal patent policy—is
addressed in further depth below.
3. Channeling Between Patent and Trade Secret Subject Matter
Both trade secret and patent law protect technical innovations. Yet, society’s
preference is for technical innovations that could qualify for patent protection to
get channeled into the patent system; that way, the public gets the useful
disclosure and knowledge from the patent.285 By contrast, if a firm chooses to
protect a technical innovation through trade secrecy, it will, by definition, be
kept secret from the public.286
In holding that state trade secret laws were not preempted by federal patent
law, the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. concluded that the
two systems for encouraging innovation “are not and never would be in
conflict.”287 In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the relative
“weakness” of state trade secret laws compared to patent.288 That is, the public
283
See supra Section II.B; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret?
How Article 2B Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (but Innovation More Difficult), 87 CALIF. L. REV.
191, 263 (1999) (observing that “there may be a few [trade secret licensing] restrictions that are so inhibiting of
innovation that they should be considered per se unlawful (a ban of reverse engineering may be one)”).
284
Rice, supra note 147, at 623; cf. First, supra note 248, at 372 (suggesting that even in the context of
antitrust litigation, “efforts to keep licensees from reverse engineering could be narrowly construed so as to be
sure that the legal limitations on the scope of trade secrecy protections are maintained”).
285
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) (“The federal patent
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain . . . . ‘[The inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its
fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is
granted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87
(1933))); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974) (observing the “federal policy favoring
disclosure of clearly patentable inventions”).
286
For a discussion of patents and trade secrets as substitute choices, see, for example, J. Jonas Anderson,
Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923–24 (2011); Lemley, supra note 226, at 314.
287
416 U.S. at 484.
288
Id. at 489–90 (“Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.”);
see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155–56 (explaining that “[t]his point was central to the [Kewanee] Court’s
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can freely exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering or independent
creation; the same limitations do not exist for patented inventions.289 Because of
these limitations on trade secret owners’ rights, the Court was convinced that
“trade secret law [posed] no reasonable risk of deterrence from patent
application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents . . . .”290
As the Court explained: “Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law
functions relatively as a sieve. The possibility that an inventor who believes his
inventions meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret,
and . . . forfeit any right to patent protection is remote indeed.”291
In recent years, however, these assumptions about the comparative benefits
of patenting over trade secrecy have come into question.292 Notable changes in
patent law, like new limits on patentable subject matter293 and the elimination of
a “general rule” of favoring injunctive remedies for patent infringement,294 have
made trade secrecy a more compelling option relative to patent. In addition,
federal expansions of trade secret law, including the recent passage of DTSA,
have led some commentators to conclude that the scales are tilting in favor of
trade secret protection at the expense of patent.295
conclusion that trade secret protection did not conflict with either the encouragement or disclosure policies of
the federal patent law”).
289
See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 490 (observing that “[w]hile trade secret law does not forbid the discovery
of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates
‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time”).
290
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489–90.
291
Id. at 490 (citation omitted); see also id. at 489 (warning, however, that “[i]f a State, through a system
of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but
rather would rely on the state protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not
constitutionally continue to exist”).
292
Even in Kewanee, Justice Marshall questioned these assumptions, observing:
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the possibility that an inventor with a patentable invention
will rely on state trade secret law rather than apply for a patent is ‘remote indeed.’ State trade
secret law provides substantial protection to the inventor[,] protection which in its unlimited
duration is clearly superior to the 17-year monopoly afforded by the patent laws. I have no doubt
that the existence of trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive
to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure
of the invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to encourage.
Id. at 493–94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
293
See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215–18 (2014); Mayo Collab. Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 91–92 (2012).
294
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
“general rule” favoring patent injunctions and requiring federal courts to apply a “well-established” four-factor
test to each case, consistent with “traditional principles of equity”).
295
See Lobel, supra note 235, at 376 (“Both the strengthening of trade secret law and the uncertainty about
patent eligibility of certain biotechnologies, business processes, and software inventions may lead today’s firms
to rely more heavily on trade secret laws.”).
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Adding to these concerns about firms channeling patentable innovations into
trade secrecy protection is their ability to augment “weaker” trade secret rights
(relative to patent) with contractual restrictions. For example, when trade secret
owners impose licensing restrictions on reverse engineering296 or obligations
that continue even after a trade secret is publicly revealed,297 they avoid the key
weaknesses of protecting an innovation through trade secret rather than patent.
Such restrictions “enhanc[e] the desirability of keeping trade secrets relative to
applying for patents.”298 As these patent-versus-trade secret channeling concerns
have magnified in recent years, a trade secret misuse doctrine that scrutinizes
such contractual practices may help push the deliberative scales back towards
patenting.
4. Abusive Overclaiming of Trade Secret Scope
In the trade secret context, as in copyright, owners engage in abusive
overclaiming of trade secret scope—for example, by threatening litigation or
bringing lawsuits to deter uses of information that are clearly permissible under
trade secret law. Trade secret claims are brought most often against employees
and former employees.299 Employees often do not have clear sense of how far
the employer’s trade secret right extends.300 In some cases, a trade secret owner
may threaten a departing employee who wants to set up her own business with
meritless trade secret litigation. Such tactics can deter the employee or force her
to enter a needless license agreement with the former employer. In the aggregate,
such acts pose negative consequences for cumulative innovation and employee
mobility.301

296

See supra Section III.B.2.
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (upholding indefinite royalty
payment obligations for the licensing of a secret keyholder design despite it “ceas[ing] to have any secrecy as
soon as it was first marketed”).
298
Dreyfuss, supra note 283, at 248 (“[A] well-drafted license—one that survives even if the trade secret
is revealed—can duplicate the benefits of patenting. With lower up-front costs, and a possibly infinite duration,
the frequency of patenting will decrease as reliance on trade secrecy protection increases.”); see also Chi. Lock
Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (expressing concern that absent a reverse engineering
limitation, trade secret law interferes with federal patent policy because it “convert[s] the Company’s . . . trade
secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin to the absolute protection that a federal patent affords”).
299
See supra text accompanying notes 22, 244.
300
See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual
Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 810 (2015) (observing that “[c]ontractually, it has become standard to include
broad and open-ended lists of confidential information that goes beyond the statutory definition of trade
secrets”); Menell, supra note 25, at 38–39 (observing that non-disclosure agreements are “confusing,
intimidating documents” for employees, which often “include a catch-all category of any information deemed
proprietary by the employer”).
301
Cf. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 106–10 (2013).
297
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The facts of CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.302 provide a useful illustration. Two
departing employees sought to leave Raytheon and start a new company.303
Upon learning of their departure, Raytheon threatened trade secret litigation to
force them to license the use of a chemical vapor deposition (cvd) process.304
The employees had signed non-disclosure contracts promising to safeguard
Raytheon’s proprietary information.305 But the cvd process was publicly
available information that had been published in government reports—a fact that
the employees emphasized to Raytheon.306 Raytheon threatened to sue them
anyway unless they signed the license agreement.307 Fearing the end of their
start-up enterprise before it had even begun, the employees agreed.308 The
license agreement imposed a royalty rate based on a flat percentage of revenue
for a ten-year period.309
The employees subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action to void
the agreement.310 Raytheon counterclaimed trade secret misappropriation and
breach of contract.311 In the absence of a misuse theory, the employees argued
that Raytheon’s acts amounted to a bad faith assertion of trade secrets in
violation of antitrust law.312 The First Circuit was amenable to this antitrust
argument only because of Raytheon’s undisputed market power—it was the
“only company in the world to produce for commercial sale zinc selenide or zinc
sulfide by chemical vapor deposition.”313 For most departing employees in a
302

769 F.2d. 842 (1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 848.
304
Id. at 847–48.
305
Id. at 847.
306
See id. at 848.
307
Id.
308
See id.; see also id. at 855 (“[T]he threat of litigation with Raytheon would have effectively prevented
them from entering into the business.”).
309
See id. at 848.
310
Id. at 857.
311
Id. at 858.
312
Id. at 857.
313
Id. at 851. The First Circuit analogized Raytheon’s acts to “cases in which patent infringement suits
have been brought in bad faith with an intent to restrain competition or monopolize.” Id. at 849–50. Certain
kinds of anticompetitive litigation constitute monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984). Under Walker Process, the enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud
on the PTO can give rise to antitrust liability. 382 U.S. at 173. Bad faith or “sham litigation” may also violate
Section 2, provided that the IP owner subjectively knew the infringement claim was baseless. See Prof’l Real
Estate Inv’rs v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60, 72 (1993) (describing “sham litigation” as an
exception to Noerr Pennington antitrust immunity which generally insulates antitrust defendants from liability
for “petitioning the government”). To succeed on either the Walker Process or “sham litigation” theories,
however, the other elements of an antitrust claim must be satisfied, including a demonstration that
“the intellectual property owner has market power.” IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 45, at § 11.04[C]. Antitrust
303
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similar situation, this antitrust argument would be unavailable, as trade secrets
do not typically confer market power.314
While CVD presented a clear-cut case of unprotectable “public”
information,315 the line between abusive overclaiming and aggressive
enforcement of a plausible trade secret claim is less clear in other cases. For
example, in Ass’n of American Medical Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), a provider of the Medical
College Admission Test (MCAT), alleged trade secret misappropriation arising
from Princeton Review’s acquisition of its test questions.316 The public nature
of the test questions was unclear because AAMC required all of its test-takers to
sign an agreement not to “duplicate, record or memorize” test questions.317
Princeton Review argued that because AAMC widely disseminated its MCAT
questions to test-takers, the questions were not secret, and any claim of trade
secret misappropriation was an attempt to misuse its trade secret rights.318 In the
absence of a trade secret misuse doctrine, Princeton Review asserted both
copyright misuse and unclean hands as defenses to the trade secret claim. The
court rejected both theories on grounds that it “could find no legal authority that
has applied copyright misuse or an unclean hands defense to a trade secret
misappropriation claim.”319 Yet even if the court had recognized a trade secret
misuse doctrine in this case, so long as AAMC had a plausible argument that its
test questions were sufficiently secret, a finding of misuse would not have been
appropriate.
C. Justifying and Implementing a Trade Secret Misuse Doctrine
As the previous section demonstrated, many of the concerns underlying
copyright misuse are relevant to trade secrecy. In both trade secrecy and
copyright, owners restrain socially valuable speech and reverse engineering, and
“overclaim” IP rights in ways that deter lawful, innovative activity. Whether a
new trade secret misuse doctrine can effectively address these concerns is a
harder question to answer. Even in the copyright context, misuse doctrine is
evolving, and its “contours . . . are still being defined.”320 Yet as this section
lawsuits based on allegations of sham IP litigation typically fail. Id. at § 11.03[B][4].
314
See supra text accompanying note 249.
315
See CVD, Inc., 769 F.2d at 854 (observing that the record in the case revealed “extensive public
disclosure” of the alleged secrets).
316
332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2004).
317
Id. at 14.
318
Id. at 24.
319
Id. at 25.
320
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
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suggests, existing doctrinal mechanisms—like attorney fee-shifting provisions,
contract non-enforcement doctrines, and the generic “unclean hands” defense—
have proven ineffective in policing problematic licensing and enforcement
behavior by trade secret owners. Antitrust law’s limitations for controlling such
behavior have already been discussed.321 A trade secret misuse doctrine could
help plug important gaps and provide beneficial overlap with existing doctrinal
mechanisms. This section also considers the potential costs of implementing a
trade secret misuse doctrine and how certain design features, like remedial
flexibility, could help address these costs.
1. Existing Doctrinal Gaps and Beneficial Overlaps
Under federal and state trade secret statutes, courts can award reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs to defendants against whom “bad faith” claims of
misappropriation have been brought.322 Such fee-shifting provisions are
intended to “deter[] opportunistic suits by raising the expected cost of weak
lawsuits and undermining the credibility of the plaintiff’s threat to go to trial.”323
The impact of attorney fee-shifting on abusive enforcement practices has proven
quite limited, however, in trade secrecy as in other IP contexts.324 As Professor
Michael Meurer observes: “The prospect of recovering attorney’s fees after trial
has no value to a defendant who goes bankrupt before trial, and perhaps little
value to a defendant who suffers financial distress because of trial cost and
delay.”325 And while fee-shifting provisions may offer some check on the
initiation of bad-faith lawsuits, they are unlikely to affect owners’ imposition of
321
See supra Section III.B.1; see also Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 539 (2003) (“[I]n practice antitrust does little to control
socially harmful IP litigation because its reach is very limited; it does not apply to opportunistic litigation and
applies only to a subset of anti-competitive litigation.”).
322
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (2018) (providing that a court may award “reasonable attorney’s fees”
where “a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad faith”); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1985) (“If . . . a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith . . . the court may award reasonable
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”). The patent, copyright, and trademark statutes also have provisions that
authorize attorney fee shifting by courts. See Meurer, supra note 321, at 536.
323
Meurer, supra note 321, at 537.
324
Id.; see Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1307–08
(2008) (suggesting that fee shifting is unlikely to prevent “copyright overenforcement in a large number of cases”
and observing that for this mechanism “to have the desired effect in a large number of cases, users must be aware
of their rights . . . [,] confident they will be able to find attorneys who are willing to take their cases in exchange
for the prospect of a court-ordered fee down the road[, a]nd . . . must be willing to litigate, if necessary, all the
way through the end of trial”); Tait Graves, Bad Faith and the Public Domain: Requiring a Pre-Lawsuit
Investigation of Potential Trade Secret Claims, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH., no. 12, 2003, at 1, 3 (observing that the
UTSA’s bad faith provisions “have been underutilized in the two decades since they were first made law,
especially outside California”).
325
Meurer, supra note 321, at 537.
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problematic contractual provisions, such as reverse engineering or speechrelated restrictions.326
Contract non-enforcement doctrines can, in theory, act as a check on
problematic contractual provisions. Under the public policy exception, courts
are empowered to deny enforcement of a contract term where it is “clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy.”327 Moreover, under the
doctrine of “unconscionability”328 a court can refuse to enforce contract terms if
a defendant lacked a “meaningful choice” when assenting to the contract (i.e.,
procedural unconscionability), and the contract terms are “unreasonably
favorable to the other party” (i.e., substantive unconscionability).329 In practice,
however, courts are reluctant to apply either of these non-enforcement doctrines
to the trade secret context.330 Moreover, unlike misuse doctrine, contract nonenforcement doctrines can be raised only by a contracting party to the offensive
licensing provision. Thus, in a fact pattern like Lasercomb—where misuse
arguments were raised by a trade secret defendant not herself subject to the
onerous licensing provisions at issue—contract non-enforcement defenses
would be unavailable. Nor would such contract non-enforcement defenses be
relevant in cases involving abusive litigation practices. In this regard, misuse
can address a broader range of problematic behavior than contract nonenforcement doctrines.331
Nor is the generic “unclean hands” defense an adequate substitute for a
misuse doctrine. The unclean hands defense “closes the doors of a court of equity
to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he
seeks relief.”332 Courts have described both patent and copyright misuse as being
related to the more generic unclean hands defense.333 Yet in some jurisdictions,
326

See supra Section III.B.2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also id. § 179; Alan E.
Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 295 (1998)
(discussing courts’ ability to assess “other laws as well as their own sense of what restrictions are needed to
protect the public welfare”).
328
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). For a general discussion of the
economics of the unconscionability doctrine, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993).
329
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573–74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Forsythe v.
BancBoston Mortg. Corp., 135 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The doctrine of unconscionability is only used
in rare instances, such as when a party abuses its right to contract freely.”).
330
See Varadarajan, supra note 170, at 1587–89.
331
See Loren, supra note 15, at 519–20 (“[M]isuse may be addressed in situations where the enforceability
of the overreaching contract clause itself need not be directly at issue.”).
332
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1945).
333
See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Copyright
misuse as a defense to an infringement action finds its origins in the equitable defense of unclean hands and is
327
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an unclean hands defense will only bar injunctive remedies, not damages.334 And
since the broader unclean hands defense is unmoored to any trade secret-specific
policy concerns, courts do not seem to know what they are looking for other than
a plaintiff’s “egregious” conduct.335 To this Author’s knowledge, the defense
has never been successfully raised by a trade secret defendant in a reported
case.336
In any event, a trade secret misuse doctrine need not be the exclusive
mechanism for challenging problematic licensing and enforcement practices by
trade secret owners. As Professor John Golden has observed, legal redundancy
can be desirable, for it “prevents undesired gaps in legal coverage while also
avoiding a need for the excessive warping of one or another doctrine to prevent
this or that particular case from falling through doctrinal cracks.”337 Thus, even
if there is some degree of overlap between existing doctrinal mechanisms and a
trade secret misuse doctrine, such overlap can be beneficial.
2. Implementation Considerations
Regarding implementation, courts are well-equipped to develop a misuse
doctrine in trade secret cases. Legislative intervention is unnecessary. After all,
misuse originated as a judge-made doctrine in both patent and copyright.338
While copyright fair use was introduced by the courts and later codified in the

similar to the patent law defense of the same name.”).
334
See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION
§ 2.4(2) (2018) (“The most orthodox view of the unclean hands doctrine makes it an equitable defense, that is,
one that can be used to defeat an equitable remedy only, but one that is unavailable to those seeking only legal
relief.”); Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 549 (2016) (“[I]n the vast
majority of jurisdictions [unclean hands] is an equitable defense good only against equitable claims.”). But see
Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (applying the unclean hands defense to
bar patentee’s enforcement of its patents against the defendant, preventing injunctive and damage remedies).
335
Wyeth v. Nat. Biologics, Inc., No. Civ. 98-2469, 2003 WL 22282371, at *23 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2003)
(denying the trade secret defendant’s unclean hands defense and observing that the “plaintiff’s conduct must be
‘egregious’ to support a finding of unclean hands”); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with
Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1091–92 (1949) (arguing that the unclean hands defense should be
replaced with more specific doctrines); Cross & Yu, supra note 15, at 459–60 (“[T]he doctrine of unclean hands
has not realized its potential. [C]ourts have applied it only rarely, . . . [in cases] involv[ing] some form of
fraud . . . .”).
336
In at least one case, even where the jury found unclean hands, the court nonetheless concluded that the
jury’s finding need not bar injunctive relief for the trade secret claimant. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 797 (5th Cir. 1999) (“DSC’s putative unclean hands do not serve as a bar to injunctive relief
grounded in trade secret misappropriation.”).
337
John M. Golden, Redundancy: When the Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 665–66 (2016)
(observing various benefits of “overlapping legal doctrines” in different legal contexts).
338
See supra Part I.
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Copyright Act, copyright misuse has never been codified.339 Even in patent law,
Congress did not enact misuse-related legislation until decades after courts first
introduced the patent misuse doctrine.340 Thus, courts can ably develop a misuse
doctrine in trade secret cases.
Yet one persistent criticism of misuse—particularly copyright misuse—is its
unpredictability.341 Because copyright misuse is unmoored from antitrust
principles and addresses multiple policy concerns, it invites more judicial
discretion and uncertainty for litigants than patent misuse.342 Introducing a
flexible, copyright-misuse inspired doctrine into trade secret law may trigger
similar objections. To be sure, uncertainty is often a feature of flexible legal
“standards” (like fair use or misuse) as opposed to more rigid “rules.”343 Given
the precision of rules, they are “costly to create up front,” whereas more
indeterminate standards “transfer those costs to the adjudicative process.”344
Intellectual property laws contain a number of malleable standards—copyright
fair use being the paradigmatic example.345 While flexible and context-specific
standards in IP introduce uncertainty and assessment costs, they allow courts to
beneficially calibrate the “scope of [an IP owner’s] entitlement to its underlying
purpose and function.”346

339
See generally Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 573 (2007)
(arguing that copyright misuse should be codified).
340
See supra text accompanying notes 107–08; see also Cty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Brock Corp., 502
F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Today, the concept of patent misuse has been cabined . . . by statute, 35 U.S.C.
271(d), which essentially eliminates from the field of ‘patent misuse’ claims based on tying and refusals to deal,
unless the patent owner has market power . . . .”).
341
See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 936 (“[I]f we are trying to find a plausible role for misuse that
goes beyond antitrust confines but does not dissolve into some sort of free-floating ‘get out of jail free’ card, we
need to be more precise about the conditions that might conceivably give rise to a finding of misuse.”).
342
Cf. Olson, supra note 15, at 597–98 (advocating a singularly speech-focused copyright misuse doctrine
and arguing that additional policy concerns for misuse will “risk[] confused and inconsistent decisions” and will
“divert[] courts’ attention away from providing practical protections for fair use rights”). On the relative merits
of “multi-purpose” doctrinal tools compared to “single-purpose” doctrinal tools, see generally Samuel L. Bray,
On Doctrines that Do Many Things, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2015).
343
For an overview of the distinction between rules and standards, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 569 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
344
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability & Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1616–17
(2009).
345
See id. at 1616 (“Intellectual property law . . . contain[s] innumerable vague standards.”); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1503 (2007) (“Intellectual
property law relies heavily on numerous vague standards . . . .”).
346
Balganesh, supra note 344; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 938 (2007) (observing that copyright’s rule-based approaches “often end up
compromising flexibility and adaptability without providing much clarity or protection for users, as courts
convert safe harbors into the only harbors, floors into ceilings, and minimums into maximums”).
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Trade secret law, like its IP cousins, already incorporates various standards.
For example, discerning a trade secret owner’s “reasonable” secrecy efforts or a
defendant’s “misappropriation” requires flexible, fact-based assessment.347
Other aspects of trade secret law also subject owners to uncertainty, including
the absence of a validating agency like the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
and the various forms of disclosure (intentional or unintentional) that can impair
the value of a trade secret.348 It seems unlikely then that the additional ex post
uncertainty from a misuse doctrine will meaningfully disturb owners’ innovation
incentives. In the absence of rigorous empirical study (for which, the trade secret
context poses particular difficulties),349 it is hard to say with certainty that the
potential benefits of a misuse doctrine will significantly outweigh the potential
costs. With that caveat, the following sections offer a few preliminary
suggestions and observations for developing a workable trade secret misuse
standard.
a. High Threshold and Burden of Proof
In general, courts should impose a high threshold for demonstrating trade
secret misuse, placing the burden of proof on the party asserting misuse. In close
cases, courts should not find misuse. A high threshold can reduce costs
associated with judicial assessment and uncertainty, by narrowing application of
the doctrine to severe cases. As Professor Golden observes, in various legal
contexts “a backstop or safety valve whose direct effect, under ordinary
circumstances, is relatively limited in frequency or intensity” does “limited
damage” to concerns of predictability and accuracy.350 And “such limited
damage might be viewed as plausibly counterbalanced by the additional
assurance provided to at least some risk-averse parties that a backstopping
standard will help prevent extreme outcomes.”351
347

See supra text accompanying note 239.
Cf. Balganesh, supra note 344, at 1620 (observing that imposing an ex post standard in copyright law
is less problematic than in patent because “copyright’s entitlement structure is certainly more contingent or
probabilistic than its equivalent in patent law. The absence of an administrative agency validating the grant at
the first instance, coupled with copyright’s emphasis on a showing of . . . copying, make its grant more
uncertain.”).
349
In general, empirical studies concerning trade secrets are quite limited, especially compared to other
areas of intellectual property. See Lobel, supra note 235, at 376 (“Because they are secret in nature, empirical
research on trade secrets has been inherently difficult to conduct.”); Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade
Secret Research, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (VOL. II –
ANALYTICAL METHODS) (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds.) (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658685 (surveying the empirical work on trade secrets and suggesting reasons for
the relative lack of empirical trade secret studies, such as the difficulty of accessing state court data).
350
Golden, supra note 337, at 709.
351
Id.
348
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In the licensing context, the absence of an explicit duration for trade secrets
may complicate the assessment of trade secret misuse. In Lasercomb, for
example, a ninety-nine-year license restriction acted as a red flag of sorts
because, as the court observed, it “could be longer than the life of the copyright
itself.”352 Similarly, in patent misuse cases like Brulotte and Kimble, licensing
restrictions that exceed the twenty-year patent term trigger special scrutiny.353
Trade secrets, in notable contrast to patents and copyright, lack an explicit end
date. Because of this durational ambiguity, courts have tended to view trade
secret licenses with long or unspecified durations more permissively than their
patent counterparts.354
In Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., for
example, the then-secret formula for Listerine was licensed under a contract that
required the licensee to pay royalties for “each & every gross of said Listerine”
sold by the licensee or “his heirs, executors or assigns.”355 The agreement
included no fixed end date; rather, the royalty obligation ended when the
licensee or its successors stopped manufacturing Listerine.356 Warner-Lambert
and its predecessors made royalty payments for over seventy-five years.357 At
some point, the formula became publicly known and published in various
medical journals, and Warner-Lambert sought a declaratory judgment that it was
no longer obligated to make payments due to the expiration of the trade secret.358
The court disagreed, holding that Warner-Lambert would have to pay royalties
until it stopped making the product.359 In doing so, the court emphasized the
unambiguous language of the contract and contrasted the “indefinite” term of
trade secrets with the fixed statutory terms of patents and copyrights.360
Similarly, in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., an inventor agreed to
disclose her secret keyholder design to Quick Point in exchange for royalty
payments that had no set end date.361 The inventor had applied for a patent on
the design and Quick Point was aware of the pending application.362 The contract
352

Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
See supra Section II.A.1.
354
See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979); Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co.
v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 665–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960) (per
curiam) (adopting District Court opinion).
355
178 F. Supp. at 658.
356
Id. at 660.
357
Id. at 657.
358
Id. at 659–60.
359
Id. at 667.
360
Id. at 665.
361
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
362
Id. at 259.
353
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mandated higher royalty payments if the inventor successfully obtained a patent
within five years, and lower royalty payments otherwise.363 Because the design
was quite simple, “it ceased to have any secrecy as soon as it was first
marketed,”364 and other competitors began selling similar keyholders. Quick
Point sought a declaratory judgment that the royalty agreement was
unenforceable once the inventor failed to get a patent.365 Applying principles of
state law rather than patent misuse, the Supreme Court did not relieve Quick
Point of its contract obligations—emphasizing the fact that “the contracting
parties agreed expressly as to alternative obligations if no patent should
issue.”366
In both of these cases, the court highlighted aspects of the agreements that
evinced the parties’ clear “intent to create ongoing obligations after the life of
the relevant intellectual property.”367 And both of these cases concerned ongoing
obligations to pay royalties, rather than long-term restrictions on the ability of
licensees to create competing products or reverse engineer. Where the latter
restraints accompany trade secret licenses with unspecified or long durations,
courts assessing misuse should be particularly scrutinizing.368
b. Procedural and Remedial Flexibility
Although misuse is typically raised as an infringement defense, courts
should be willing to consider trade secret misuse arguments in other procedural
contexts—for example, when raised in a declaratory judgment action or as a
defense to a contract claim.369 Courts in copyright misuse cases have been
particularly inflexible in this regard, typically refusing to consider misuse
arguments unless raised as a defense to copyright infringement.370 In the patent
363

See id.
Id. at 259–66.
365
Id.
366
Id. at 262–64.
367
Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., 579 F.3d 319, 329 (3d Cir. 2009).
368
Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 283, at 264–65 (arguing that trade secret licensing restrictions with indefinite
or long durations should be analyzed for reasonableness and observing that state courts, in the context of
remedies, “have shown increasing willingness to reject applications for permanent injunctions and to opt instead
for relief that extends only for so long as the information would have remained secret”).
369
See Apple Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2009) (“PsyStar may well have a legitimate interest in establishing misuse independent of Apple’s claim against
it, for example, to clarify the risks it confronts by marketing the products at issue in this case or others it may
wish to develop.”); cf. Meurer, supra note 321, at 529–30 (describing how a declaratory judgment action allows
a potential IP defendant to “respond quickly . . . instead of waiting for an infringement suit that could be
strategically delayed” and allows “potential defendants to organize and share costs”).
370
See, e.g., Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider
copyright misuse argument as a defense to state law claims regarding enforcement of software licenses); Arista
364
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misuse context, by contrast, courts appear more willing to consider misuse
arguments raised in a declaratory judgment action or as a defense to a breach of
contract claim.371
Along with more procedural flexibility, courts should also have flexibility in
tailoring the appropriate remedy for a trade secret owner’s misuse. In some
cases, misuse’s traditional remedy may be “disproportionate” to the harm arising
from misuse.372 Citing this concern, Professor Thomas Cotter has argued that in
cases involving “transactional misuse,” the remedy should be unenforceability
of the offending contractual provision, rather than misuse’s traditional remedy
that renders the underlying IP right unenforceable for a period of time.373 By
contrast, Professor Olson has argued that misuse’s traditional penalty is a
“uniquely effective . . . deterrent” for speech-chilling practices by copyright
owners, which are perpetuated both through licensing provisions as well as
abusive enforcement tactics.374
In deciding between misuse’s traditional penalty, the unenforceability of the
IP right for a period of time, and a lesser penalty, such as not enforcing a

Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 428 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[C]opyright misuse is not a claim
but a defense, and Defendants may not transmute it into an independent claim merely by labeling it one for
‘declaratory judgment.’”); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1182–83
(E.D. Mo. 2004) (expressing “reluctan[ce] to apply the copyright misuse defense as a defense to a contract
claim”); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding
that “copyright misuse does not form the basis of an affirmative claim”). But see Midwest Tape, LLC v.
Recorded Books, LLC, No. 3:09 CV 2176, 2010 WL 1258101, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2010) (“[B]ecause the
Complaint seeks declaratory judgment, the plaintiff may assert copyright misuse as an affirmative claim.”); Open
Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (same).
371
See, e.g., Cty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 732–33 (considering a patent
licensee’s misuse argument raised in declaratory judgment action: “County Line wanted the district court to
declare that the [term] was unenforceable because it violated federal patent policy, essentially raising an
anticipatory patent misuse defense to its planned breach of the Agreement.”). However, the percentage of patent
misuse arguments raised in the context of a declaratory judgment action versus an affirmative defense is quite
small. See Lim, supra note 15, at 384 (“While [patent] misuse may be invoked by declaratory judgments, it
featured in only about 7% of misuse cases between 1953 and 2012 . . . .”).
372
See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 903 (critiquing misuse’s remedy for “bear[ing] no necessary
relationship to the scope of the misconduct or the harm flowing from it” and “in turn, poses a risk that in some
cases the sanction will be grossly disproportionate to the offense and thus may create a substantial risk of
overdeterrence”); Lemley, supra note 15, at 1616–17 (“[T]he level of the patent misuse sanction is not related
to the severity of the patent misuse violation.”).
373
See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 903, 963–64 (“[I]n cases involving transactional misuse, the
penalty should be limited to nonenforceability of the challenged provision . . . . For litigation misuse . . . ,
however, the unenforceability penalty may continue to be one, though perhaps not the only, option available to
deter abusive litigation.”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 106, at 561, 563 (describing the patent
unenforceability remedy for misuse as “draconian” and suggesting that courts “simply enjoin an abusive practice
or deny relief to the plaintiff in a particular case”).
374
See Olson, supra note 15, at 597.
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particular contract provision, courts should weigh this trade-off between
effective deterrence and causing a particular IP owner disproportionate harm. In
cases where trade secret owners undercut whistleblowing activity or engage in
abusive overclaiming practices, a more deterrent-oriented misuse remedy that
renders the trade secret unenforceable for a period of time is likely appropriate.
And with this remedy, a court would also have to determine the requisite
conditions to be met before the trade secret owner could resume enforcing its
trade secret.375 In cases involving problematic licensing restrictions, however, a
contract non-enforcement remedy may be more proportionate to the harm.376
Allowing courts flexibility to tailor a misuse remedy can help minimize error
costs and may lessen courts’ unwillingness to check misuse solely because of
the severity of the traditional penalty.377
CONCLUSION
Courts developed the equitable doctrine of misuse to police the overzealous
contracting and enforcement behavior of patent and copyright owners. In recent
decades, courts have narrowed patent misuse doctrine to reflect antitrust law’s
competitive concerns. By contrast, copyright misuse cases continue to evince
broader IP policy concerns. While the contours of copyright misuse are
evolving, courts and claimants invoke this doctrinal vehicle to scrutinize
owners’ (i) restrictions on critical speech and reverse engineering, (ii) attempts
to protect functional works through the “back-door” of copyright rather than
patent, and (iii) enforcement tactics that overclaim or misrepresent copyright
scope, particularly to legally unsophisticated audiences. Trade secret owners
engage in similarly problematic behavior—restraining reverse engineering,
deterring critical speech, and overclaiming trade secret scope to legally
unsophisticated employees. Despite these similarities, courts have not developed
an analogous misuse doctrine in trade secret law. As trade secrecy’s legal and
economic importance has soared in recent years, perhaps the time has come to
consider a misuse doctrine for trade secret law. While it need not mimic the
procedural and remedial inflexibility of its copyright misuse cousin, a trade

375
See Harris, supra note 15, at 115 (suggesting that this determination is “relatively straightforward”
where a discrete licensing practice is the basis of the misuse determination, but less so in other contexts); Olson,
supra note 15, at 603 (“In cases of prolonged misuse . . . a court should hold that it takes some time to cure
the . . . effects . . . .”).
376
Cf. Cotter, Misuse, supra note 15, at 963–64.
377
See supra text accompanying note 84; cf. Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 458
(D. Del. 1963) (acknowledging that while the patentee “attempted to do that which he was incapable of
legitimately doing, the application of the doctrine of misuse is too drastic”).
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secret misuse doctrine could help check the contractual and enforcement
excesses of trade secret owners.

